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Refugee right.  Law of hospitality. Original right to a place.  Principle of Right. 
Cosmopolitan right. Right of nations. Sovereignty and self-determination. 
Coercion. Moral progress. 
 
Despite the importance to and influence of Kant’s work on contemporary moral 
and political philosophy, little has been written concerning the possible 
application of Kant’s moral and political principles to the issue of refugee right. 
Such lack of exploration seems even more surprising in light of recent refugee 
crises making headlines across the globe. This thesis constructs a Kantian 
account of refugee right by examining and applying the Kantian principles of the 
law of hospitality and the original right to a place on Earth, while balancing these 
rights against the right of nations to self-determination. As such, this thesis starts 
with a thorough analysis of Kant’s moral and political framework, drawing from 
both the Doctrine of Right and Perpetual Peace. The law of hospitality and original 
right to a place on Earth are explicated and drawn upon to construct a concept of 
refugee right in accordance with Kant’s Principle of Right and wider principles of 
freedom. Then the scope of the thesis is broadened to examine how such a 
refugee right could realistically be implemented across the globe at the level of 
international relations and law. After careful examination of Kant’s views on 
sovereignty and self-determination, it is found that nations cannot be coerced to 
follow laws as individuals can. As a result, Kant’s admittedly vaguer concept of 
moral progress will be found to be an essential factor with regard to the realisation 
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"No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a 
part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as 
well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own 
were: any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and 
therefore never send to know for whom the bells tolls; it tolls for thee" – John 
Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, "Meditation XVII". 
 
The moral inspiration for this thesis can be found in the refugee crisis that affected 
Europe between 2014 and 2019. The European Refugee Crisis was caused, in 
large part, by the Syrian Civil War, with many Syrians crossing into Europe to 
escape the vicious conflict that had broken out in the Middle East. In addition to 
Syrians, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees noted that Afghanis 
and Iraqis were among the top three nationalities migrating to Europe. The crisis 
triggered debate within European nations, with many questioning the extent to 
which Europe was practically able to house these refugees and to what extend 
European countries were obligated to do so.  
 
Refugee crises have been common throughout history, the Israelites fled Egypt, 
the Irish after the Great Famine, and the Jews and other displaced peoples 
before, during, and after World War Two. As the effects of climate change 
become more and more profound, refugee crises could be set to become far more 
common. How will nations distribute citizens of another country after their home 
falls into the sea, as has already started happening in Kiribati? Will states be able 
to force other, nearby states to accept refugees? What state benefits will refugees 
be able to access in their new home?  
 
To gain answers to these questions, I turned to the work of Prussian philosopher 
of right, Immanuel Kant. While not particularly known for his work in the political 
sphere, Kant had fascinating ideas on enlightenment and how nations should 
interact with one another. This thesis will begin by exploring Kant’s philosophy, 
examining the roots of his entire moral outlook – freedom, before then going to 
explore the complex framework of rights that grow from freedom, resulting in the 
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formation of the juridical state. With this knowledge in mind, the second chapter 
will focus on constructing a Kantian refugee right that is compatible with the 
theories and ideas outlined in the first chapter. The second chapter will draw on 
Kant’s existing ideas of the law of hospitality and the original right to a place on 
Earth to construct this Kantian account of refugee right. Following this, the third 
chapter will explore international law in Kant and the right of nations in an effort 
to determine whether an international framework can be established with the 
power to enforce rights, such as refugee right, between states. The final chapter 
will follow on from the conclusions of the prior chapter, determining how a refugee 
right could be implemented internationally and how this could tie into Kant’s ideas 
of perpetual peace. While the initial aim of this chapter will be to have an 
international refugee right implemented in a similar manner to rights in the 
domestic state, international law will be shown to be far more complicated than 
domestic law. Kant’s conclusions on cosmopolitan right, perpetual peace, and 
the universal society of humans will tie into the theme of Donne’s poem at the 
start of this introduction, showing that ‘a violation of rights in one part of 









Chapter One:  Freedom, Right, and the Juridical State 
 
Before we consider the construction of a Kantian refugee right, we need to 
examine key aspects of Kant’s philosophy of right and freedom. Kant’s entire 
philosophical body of work comprises a delicate and complex framework, of 
axioms, rights, postulates, principles, and syllogisms. This chapter will lay down 
the groundwork for any further discussion on right and coercion across the 
remainder of this thesis, providing the framework upon which any form of refugee 
right may attach itself. This chapter will begin with the foundations of Kant’s 
Doctrine of Right, briefly introducing internal freedom before going on to explore 
external freedom as the basis for Right in Kant. If freedom is the petrol in Kant’s 
moral engine, then right and coercion are the inner workings that direct the flow 
of that petrol. Kant’s notions of property and possession will also be briefly 
discussed, highlighting his analysis of land acquisition and possession of the 
Earth in common. Finally, Kant’s notions of the state of nature and an individual’s 
obligation to leave it in order to form a juridical state will be discussed. The aim 
of this chapter will be to understand Kant’s notion of freedom as the cornerstone 
of Kant’s political philosophy and a foundation to Kant’s juridical state. This will 
provide the framework upon which the remainder of this thesis will construct a 
Kantian account of refugee right. 
 
1. Kantian Freedom: An Overview  
Before any discussion on right, or even refugee right can begin, we must explore 
Kant’s idea of freedom. This not only comes from the fact that freedom is the 
basis of all rights in Kant, but also from the fact that, if we are to protect the 
freedom of both refugees and citizens, how the concept ought to be understood 
should be spelt out clearly. For, questions that will come up later in this thesis, 
such as how refugee right could be enforced, whether a refugee right would 
violate the ownership rights of citizens, and even why refugees flee their home 
states in the first place, come back to the concept of freedom in Kant. While the 
ensuing discussion of refugee right will ultimately expand beyond the bounds of 
the domestic juridical state and into international and cosmopolitan right, 
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everything must come back to the principle of right and its integral relation with 
freedom.  
 
While external freedom is of direct concern to our discussion, it is important to at 
least have a brief understanding of Kant’s notions of internal freedom. For Kant, 
human nature can be understood in terms of three different categories; animality, 
humanity, and personality (Wood, 1999, pp 118). Animality refers to a creature’s 
base desires such as a survival drive or a drive to propagate the species. In 
Religion Kant refers to this as ‘mechanical self-love’ (6:26-27). Humans share 
this aspect of their nature with other animals. However, it is in the category of 
humanity that Kant separates humans from the wider animal kingdom. The 
category of humanity allows for the capacity to set one’s own ends according to 
reason (4:437). The category of humanity is also tied closely to the personality 
category, which is essentially autonomy. Personality allows for an individual to 
give oneself to the moral law and follow the moral law as a sole motive of will 
(4:435, 439-40). This mention of will, however, also ought to be briefly elucidated 
before moving onto the concept of external freedom.  
 
Freedom is defined as the ‘independence of the capacity for choice from coercion 
by sensuous impulses’ (Caygill, 1995, pp 414).  This is because we have in us a 
power of self-determination manifest in the ‘ought’, which Kant refers to as the 
will. Kant’s discussion of the will is conducted in terms of a distinction between 
the will (Wille) and ‘capacity for choice’ (Willkür). For Kant, Willkür relates to a 
negative account of freedom. More specifically, Willkur is the capacity of an agent 
to act on the basis of a free choice. While ‘brutes’ (animals) as Kant calls them 
may have a capacity for choice (Willkur)1, they do not have will (Wille).2 For Kant, 
only a choice can be free, as a will is neither free nor unfree (6:226).3 Wille relates 
 
1 ‘Kant uses the distinction of Wille and Willkür when he identifies the will as the source of the 
ought which determines the capacity for choice, and effects its independence from sensuous 
impulses (Caygill, 1995, pp 414)’. 
2 Willkur is capacity of a rational agent to act on the basis of maxims, i.e. in the light of an idea 
or representation of law. Which involves the capacity of acting independently from or even 
against inclinations or particular desires. Instead of responding automatically to the strongest 
desire (pathological necessitation), a free agent can weigh and evaluate desires, prioritise some 
and repress others.   
3 “Laws proceed from the will, maxims from choice. In man the latter is a free choice; the will, 
which is directed to nothing beyond the law itself, cannot be called either free or unfree, since it 
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to a positive account of internal freedom. This account is positive as it allows for 
the ‘capacity to follow determinate laws given by the faculty of reason’ (6:214). 
More specifically, it is the capacity to act for reasons other than those of feelings, 
impulses, or desires (Wood, 1999, pp 119-120). The positive side of internal 
freedom is that it is pure practical reason that can determine what actions will be. 
Actions are determined by reason when one abides by the categorical imperative 
(and when one acts for obligatory ends of reason, as per theory of virtue), that is, 
to ‘act only in accord with those maxims through which you can simultaneously 
will that they become a universal law (4:421).’ 
 
Now that the internal notions of freedom have been briefly introduced, the 
discussion will turn to external freedom – a concept that operates as Kant’s 
keystone for his entire Doctrine of Right. As with internal freedom, external 
freedom has both a negative and a positive aspect.4 The negative aspect is 
described as the independence from being constrained by ‘another’s 
necessitating choice (6:237)’ (Nötigender Wilkür). The positive aspect is 
‘dependence on law… in a juridical state (6:237)’, though this will be explored in 
more depth later in the chapter. Here, it is the negative aspect of external freedom 
that will take centre stage. For Kant, external freedom is vital to his Doctrine of 
Right as it concerns action in pursuit of one’s chosen ends where actions have 
effects in the world that impact other people:  
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as 
it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, 
is the only original right belonging to every human by virtue of his humanity 
(6:237). 
 
In other words, Kant believes that every human is innately free to pursue their 
own ends so long as pursuit of these ends can co-exist with the freedom of others 
in accordance with a universal law. In other words, one’s freedom to pursue one’s 
chosen ends ought not to be limited by others unless their maxim, if universalised, 
would conflict with others’ rights to pursue legitimate ends. This right ought to be 
 
is not directed to actions but immediately to giving laws for the maxims of actions (and is, 
therefore, practical reason itself) (6:226). 
4 The positive side of external freedom will be discussed in a later section as it is, essentially, 
the idea of moving into a juridical state and submitting before public law.  
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understood in relational terms of one individual to another, as the innate right to 
freedom gives each person a right to his own freedom so long as it also restricted 
by the rights of others to do the same under universal law (Ripstein, 2010, pp 30). 
While everyone possesses a right of external freedom, this ought not to be seen 
as every human possessing equal amounts of freedom; rather, Kant’s view is 
focussed on ‘the respective independence of persons from each other (Ripstein, 
2010, pp 33)’. More specifically, Kant’s external freedom encompasses both 
positive and negative accounts of freedom. Kant is not saying we all have equal 
positive freedom to do things (to be athletes, artists, intellectuals and so on) but 
we all have equal negative freedom. Kant derived a general principle of right from 
the innate right to freedom:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (6:230).  
 
The innate right to external freedom is the only innate right humans possess and 
it gives rise to countless acquired rights, maxims, and axioms that form Kant’s 
Doctrine of Right. Directly, the right to external freedom also entails four other 
rights that may, at first, appear separate from the axiom. Those rights are the 
right to equal treatment under the law; the right to legal independence; the right 
to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; and the right to freedom of 
expression:  
This principle of innate freedom already involves the following authorisations, 
which are not really distinct from it: innate equality . . .; hence, a man's quality of 
being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a man beyond reproach (iusti), 
since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to 
anyone; and finally, his being authorised to do to others anything that does not in 
itself diminish what is theirs so long as they do not want to accept it (6:237-8).  
The right to equal treatment under the law was implicit in the right to external 
freedom. The right to equal treatment under the axiom of external freedom can 
be seen clearly in the Doctrine of Right ‘innate quality, that is, independence from 
being bound by others to do more than one can in turn bind them (6:238)’. In 
other words, I can only obligate others to respect my right to own land if I will do 
the same in return. The right to legal independence can be seen in the right to be 
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one’s own master – ‘a man's quality of being his own master (sui iuris) 
independence from being constrained by another’s choice… (6:238)’. If I am to 
be presumed to be externally free according to the law, then only I may determine 
what my actions will be. If my action is compatible with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with a universal law, no other individual has the right to force me 
to do anything. Thirdly, the right to be presumed innocent can be seen in Kant’s 
assertion that an individual is ‘beyond reproach (6:238)’. This prohibits anyone 
from being charged with a crime without good reason or evidence. This may at 
first appear to line up with the thoughts of the natural-law philosophers, with 
Pufendorf’s claim that ‘everyone is presumed to be good unless the opposite is 
proved (De Jure, P.803)’ and Achenwall’s claim that ‘everyone is presumed to be 
just, until the opposite is proved’ (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 82). Kant, 
however, suggests that one does not need to presume goodness on the part of 
others, rather, one should presume they are ‘not bad’ and that they are ‘externally 
just’ (6:301; Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 83). The innate right to external 
freedom also entails the right to freedom of expression, as the right to express 
one’s own thoughts does not impact on others’ freedom of choice (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, pp 81).  
 
In sum, internal freedom is associated with ability to act from internal reasons 
rather than causal necessitation, whereas external freedom regulates the 
behaviour of others in a reciprocal manner in order to balance the freedom of all. 
External freedom is an innate right – because it is something others can affect or 
curtail but generally should not interfere with (except in cases of justified coercion, 
though this will be explored in the following section).  External freedom, according 
to Kant, is the only innate right we can possess. It is denial of such freedoms that 
are often the cause of refugees fleeing their countries to gain entry to countries 
where these freedoms are more established and institutionally protected. This 
section raises significant considerations for the future discussion of a refugee 
right. If there is a refugee right in Kant it will have to be shown to flow from the 
innate right to external freedom and be compatible with the freedoms of others in 




2. Universal Principle of Right and Coercion  
While the prior section introduced the Kantian concepts of both internal and 
external freedom, it is external freedom that will be the cornerstone of this 
chapter. For Kant, right, as opposed to virtue, is concerned only with the external 
actions of an agent. For virtue and ethics, the worth of the action is based on the 
end the agent has in mind, or their motivation for acting. For instance, if one is to 
care for one’s mother one must do so with the mother’s well-being as an end in 
and of itself, rather than the promise of wealth or so on, if the action is to have 
moral worth. On the other hand, right is concerned an agent’s external actions 
and their impact on the freedom and rights of others rather than their internal 
reasons for acting. Right does not take into account whether one acts according 
to the ‘wish of the other… as in actions of beneficence or callousness’ (6:230), 
rather, it depends solely on the fact that the choice is free and whether the actions 
of one person may be harmonised with the freedom of others in accordance with 
a universal law (6:230). For Kant, right is:  
… the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with 
the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom (6:230).  
 
We can see from the above that Kant views right as an action that can in principle 
be harmonised with the freedom of others. It is with that in mind that Kant states 
his Universal Principle of Right:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (6:230).  
If James eats an apple every day before work, and the act of eating this apple 
coexists with the freedom of others in accordance with a universal law, it would 
be wrong to hinder or prevent James from eating his apple. Preventing James 
from eating his pre-work apple would not be compatible with freedom in 
accordance with a universal law (6:230-1). The universal principle of right, while 
implying an obligation, does not demand that the agent limit himself to these 
conditions for the sake of right (6:231). Rather, the idea of freedom simply is 
limited to the conditions of right in accordance with the freedom of others.5 
 
5 Separating right from virtue is the very basis of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, with one half 
named the Doctrine of Right and the other the Doctrine of Virtue.  
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Limiting oneself in accordance with the freedom of others gives rise to a 
discussion of Kantian duty. While the focus of this section will be on the distinction 
between ethical and juridical duties, it would also be germane to give a brief 
introduction to Kant’s notions of positive/ negative duties and imperfect/ perfect 
duties. Firstly, a positive duty is one that commands action, whereas a negative 
duty is one that prohibits certain actions (6:419). In addition to the distinction 
between positive/ negative duties, Kant also made distinctions between perfect/ 
imperfect duties. For Kant, a perfect duty is one we must always do, allowing for 
“no exception in favour of inclination” (4:421). We have perfect duties to both 
ourselves and others. An example of a perfect duties to oneself is refraining from 
suicide and an example of a perfect duty to others is to refrain from making 
promises you have no intention of keeping. On the other hand, an imperfect duty 
is one that ought not to be ignored but has multiple methods of fulfilment (4:421). 
In a similar vein to perfect duties, we also have imperfect duties to others and 
ourselves. Examples of imperfect duties to others are to contribute to the 
happiness of others and an imperfect duty to oneself is to develop one’s talents 
(6:419).  
 
With this understanding of duty in mind, the discussion can now move onto ethical 
and juridical duties. The difference between ethical and juridical duties is tied to 
their motivations (Potter, 1994, pp 97). Juridical (external) duties are imposed by 
juridical laws, which may make use of external means of coercion to ensure 
compliance. On the other hand, ethical duties require solely internal means of 
motivation, such as duty as an end itself. All juridical duties are external in the 
sense that they require (or forbid) only external actions, rather than internal 
motivations. This relates to the fact that a Kantian juridical duty is a perfect duty, 
as it requires performance or non-performance of an external action (Ripstein, 
2010, pp 17):  
The doctrine of Right and the doctrine of virtue are therefore distinguished not so 
much by their different duties as by the difference in their law giving, which 
connects one incentive or the other with the law (Potter, 1994, pp 98).  
On the other hand, ethical duties require that the agent adopt their ends at will 
(Ripstein, 2010, pp 11). More specifically, ethical duties require the adoption of 
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obligatory ends from the motive of respect for law or duty, without any specific 
action required to follow that end – this makes them an imperfect duty.  
 
On the surface, the idea that Kant supports coercive juridical force may appear 
to conflict with the right to external freedom. However, these strict rights are 
based on the idea that it is possible to deploy external coercion in accordance 
with universal laws. It was shown above that a prohibited action is defined as that 
which is incompatible with freedom in accordance with universal laws (6:231). 
With this in mind, Right also contains an authorisation to hinder the freedom of 
others in certain circumstances. If a free action is hindering the freedom of others 
in accordance with universal laws, then coercion used in opposition to this is 
consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws (6:231). Therefore, 
according to the principle of contradiction, right contains a permission to coerce 
others if Right is infringed (Gregor, 1988, pp 772). It ought to be made clear, 
however, that this only affects external actions and not internal motivations for 
action. Where coercion is in principle justified, the intent of the coercion is purely 
to modify the external actions of the offender, not change their internal attitudes 
or motivations (Wood, 1999, pp 44). 
One notable addition to the notion of Right is that it is reciprocal. Kant describes 
this clearly within the Doctrine of Right in the following passage:  
The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the freedom of 
everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, the construction 
of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a priori, by analogy 
with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the 
equality of action and reaction (6:232-3).  
Kant uses the notion of equal and opposite reaction to highlight the need for 
universal and reciprocal rights. For instance, with regard to the innate right to 
external freedom, this right is a negative right in the sense that it is a right to be 
free from someone’s necessitating will; that is, the right to be free from another’s 
choice (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 78). However, it also requires that everyone 
respects everyone’s innate right to external freedom. It is reciprocal coercion, as 




The main conclusion that ought to be drawn so far is that the concept of external 
freedom flows directly from the innate right to freedom, and the universal principle 
of right is also derived from this innate right to freedom. The authorised use of 
coercion pertains only when a use of freedom (free choice of action) is a 
hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (coercion is justified in 
these instances by being a hindrance to a hindrance to freedom, therefore a 
promotion of freedom, hence ‘right’) (6:231). Right is thus connected by the 
principle of contradiction with authorised coercion (6:231). The concept of ‘a right’ 
is inherent in the idea that universal reciprocal coercion is essentially linked to 
the possibility of everyone’s freedom (6:232). The Doctrine of Right (ius) is the 
sum of those laws for which an external lawgiving is possible (6:229). The 
concept of a right is inherent in the idea that universal reciprocal coercion is 
essentially linked to the possibility of everyone’s freedom (6:232). With regard to 
the future discussion of refugee right, it would thus seem that any form of refugee 
right must abide by the universal principle of right and, as it concerns external 
actions, may even be supported by coercion.  
 
3. Private Right and Property 
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant extends the right to external freedom to include 
rights to private property. The right to property is of vital importance to Kant’s 
Doctrine of Right, as it acts as the foundation of the juridical state. Consequently, 
he dedicates lot of time to exploring the concept of possession. Kant must not 
only explain how the innate right to freedom leads to a right to property, but he 
must also show how intelligible (non-physical) possession can be possible.  
 
Kant gives two different interpretations of the concept of that which is externally 
mine, or possession. The nominal definition of external possession is as follows:  
That outside me is externally mine which it could be wrong (an infringement 
upon my freedom which can coexist with the freedom of everyone in 
accordance with a universal law) to prevent me from using as I please (6:248). 
The real definition of what is externally mine, however, can be deduced as 
‘something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use 
of it even though I am not in possession of it (not holding the object) (6:248)’. In 
other words, I must have a claim over an object for that object to be mine, 
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otherwise if someone used that object contrary to my will it would not wrong or 
affect me. The nature of this claim, however, is yet to be determined. According 
to Kant, rightful possession can include two different kinds of possession, 
sensible and intelligible possession:  
That is rightfully mine with which I am so connected that another’s use of it 
without my consent would wrong me. The subjective condition of any possible 
use is possession. But something external would be mine only if I may assume 
that I could be wronged by another’s use of a thing even though I am not in 
possession if it. So it would be self-contradictory to say that I have something 
external as my own if the concept of possession could not have different 
meanings, namely sensible possession and intelligible possession, and by the 
former could be understood physical possession but by the later merely rightful 
possession of the same object (6:245). 
 
From the above, we can gather that Kant conceives of two different kinds of 
possession – sensible and intelligible possession. Sensible possession is the 
idea that I possess the iPhone because I am currently holding the iPhone. 
Intelligible possession, however, is the idea that even if I am not in physical 
possession of the iPhone, I would be wronged by someone’s use of it against my 
will. Kant draws the justification of intelligible possession from the permissive 
postulate6:  
It is possible for me to have any external object of my choice as mine, that is, a 
maxim by which if it were to become a law, an object of choice would in itself 
(objectively) have to belong to no one (res nullius) is contrary to rights (6:246). 
Kant then restates this idea later as a postulate of practical reason with regard 
to rights:  
It is a duty of right to act towards others so that what is external (usable) could 
also become someone’s… (6:252).  
This right to possession is not separate from the innate right to freedom, rather, 
it is acquired directly from the innate right (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 144). Although 
the innate right to freedom implies that subjects have a right to freedom of 
choice, including property rights, these rights are not contained within the innate 
right but follow as a result of it (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 102). The right to 
 
6 Permissive in this sense is not simply permitted, but ‘merely permitted’.  
 18 
what is externally mine is therefore acquired from the right to freedom 
(Flikschuh, 2000, pp 144), making property an acquired right. The possibility of 
intelligible possession follows from the above postulate of practical reason with 
regard to rights:  
If it is necessary to act in accordance with that principle of right, its intelligible 
condition (a merely rightful possession) must then also be possible (6:252) 
If practical reason forbade the intelligible private possession then freedom would 
not have the rightful power to use objects of choice over which we have physical 
power, even if this would be consistent with the freedom of everyone in 
accordance with universal laws. However, this would be inconsistent with the 
axiom of outer freedom7 and would result in res nullius:  
Having an absolute prohibition against ownership of things would render usable 
things useless, limiting choice and thereby introducing a contradiction into the 
axiom of freedom (6:246-7).  
If practical reason were to suggest that an external object of our choice was 
unusable, it would make our right to exercise freedom dependent on the objects 
themselves, rather than the principle of its compatibility with the freedom of 
everyone. Consequently, if an object was beyond the use of anyone, it would be 
a contradiction of reason with itself in prohibiting what is right according to its own 
formal principle (Gregor, 1988, pp 775). In other words, reason cannot support a 
blanket prohibition against use of an ‘external object of choice’ as this would be 
‘contradiction of external freedom with itself (6: 246)’. Kant goes on to suggest 
that, if using an external object of choice ‘to the exclusion of others’ was wrong, 
‘freedom would rob itself of the use of its choice in regard to an object by placing 
all usable objects beyond any possibility of actually using them…’ (6:246, Byrd 
and Hruschka, 2011, pp 114). Byrd and Hruschka sum up Kant’s worries of res 
nullius with the following:  
If practical reason contained an absolute prohibition against using an external 
object of choice, I could not take an unowned apple and eat it… No one would 
be permitted to take and use anything. Such a prohibition would make us 
spectators in a world filled with usable objects of choice we could not use. The 
entire land and the things upon it could not be used by force of law. We cannot 
 
7 Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist 
with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right 
belonging to every human by virtue of his humanity (6:237). 
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conceive of such a law as a law of reason and thus a law of freedom (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, pp 114).  
Consequently, the postulate of pure practical reason and intelligible possession 
is an extension of practical reason facilitated by the innate right to external 
freedom and pure practical reason. This permissible law allows for each 
individual to place everyone else under the obligation to not use objects of their 
choice due to prior possession. This possession is not physical possession, but 
the concept of having the object. In other words, an object is considered ‘mine’ 
when my will controls the object even if I am not in direct contact with the object.  
 
The possibility of a rightful relation with regard to property (external objects) flows 
from the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, which shows that it 
must be possible to possess objects external to one’s own body (Ripstein, 2010, 
pp 23). The purpose of the permissive postulate is to extend the right to external 
freedom to external objects. However, an owner’s relation to their object is not 
the core of Kant’s right of possession, it is the right to ‘constrain others with 
respect to that object’ that is the focus of this right (Ripstein, 2010, pp 63). If an 
external object is the property of an agent, it is subject to their choice and this 
forbids others from interfering with it. Intelligible possession is possession from 
‘a pure concept of understanding’ (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 111). The 
concept in terms of right is that an external possession is an object that is distinct 
from an agent but remains under the control of that agent and is also possible for 
them to use it. Understanding Kant’s notions of possession are vital to the 
upcoming discussion on the juridical state.  
 
4. Original Possession of the Earth 
The first chapter has so far focussed on the importance of freedom and property 
right to the Kantian domestic state. However, Kant also works from an underlying 
assumption of a notion of original possession of a place on Earth in connection 
with the innate right to freedom. Kant’s notion of original possession will be 
elucidated in the following three subsections:  
1. The original possession of the Earth.  
2. The original community of the Earth.  
3. The original united will.   
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The notion of original possession of the earth is not only vital to understanding 
Kant’s formation of the juridical state but will also be vital in understanding the 
refugee right that will be elucidated in the second chapter of this thesis.  
 
4.1 
Gottfried Achenwall, a German philosopher, statistician and prominent influence 
on Kant’s philosophy, especially Kant’s account of original possession, 
endeavoured in his Ius Naturae to establish how one could own property 
originally, rather than only through acquisition (Achenwall, §100). For Achenwall, 
the right to use unused things is related ‘promiscuously’ to unspecified objects 
(including land), rather than specific objects (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 125). 
This promiscuous right to unspecified objects flows from humanity’s innate right 
to freedom and is therefore innate in our species. The exercise of this right does 
not injure anyone, tying it to the concept of non-damaging use in natural law 
theory.8  
 
Achenwall’s ideas provide a foundation for Kant’s own ideas of original 
possession of the Earth and the right to unused things (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, 
pp 126). Kant understood land to mean ‘all habitable ground’, and if one is to 
possess moveable items on the land, one must first be in rightful possession of 
the land (6:261). If the land belonged to no one this would be res nullius. 
Consequently, Kant draws the rational concept of original possession from the 
postulate of practical reason and allows people to use the Earth according to the 
principle of right. However, the notion of original possession raises an important 
question. As explained earlier, Kant’s theory of rights includes two kinds of rights, 
original and acquired (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 153). However, the only original right 
is the innate right to freedom. The conceptual problem here is that, if an object is 
acquired originally it is acquired without being derived from someone else’s will –
if so, how does one acquire an external object originally?  
 
 
8 Non-damaging use (ius utilitatis innoxiae) is a right rooted in natural law theory that allows an 
individual to use the property of another if this use doesn’t harm either the owner or the object. 
Examples of this are drinking from a stream belonging to another or crossing land for a 
reasonable purpose (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 206).  
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The answer to the conundrum of original acquisition flows from the innate right to 
freedom. As was shown in the first section, there is only one original right and 
that is the right to external freedom. The idea here is that, in a similar manner to 
Achenwall’s concept of promiscuous right, the original right to a place on Earth 
originates directly from this fundamental right of freedom. As Kant stated: 
All men are originally (i.e., prior to any act that establishes a right) in a possession 
of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever 
nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them… original possession in 
common is, rather, a practical rational concept which contains a priori the 
principle in accordance with which alone men can use a place on the earth in 
accordance with principles of right. (6:262). 
This right to a place on earth exists without will (unbescholten) and ‘merely in 
virtue of their physical entrance into the world’ (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 157). This 
right relates, to use Achenwall’s term, promiscuously to an indeterminate piece 
of land unused by others. However, Kant’s disjunctive right to a place on Earth 
has a far broader scope. This right relates to a place on the earth even if all the 
land on earth has been claimed by others (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 128)9. 
In other words, the original right to possession of the earth can be described as 
a right to exist on Earth, ‘I find myself originally on the land, since it is inseparable 
from my existence (6:262)’:  
The right to freedom means inter alia that no one may kill or injure me physically. 
Denying me a piece of the earth (by throwing me into the ocean or rocketing me 
into space) would result in my death, which makes disjunctively universal 
possession a right (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 128). 
 
Rather than using Achenwall’s term, Kant labelled this a disjunctive right 
(disjunktiver Allgemeinbesitz), specifically meaning that ‘everyone can possess 
this or that place on the earth.’ It is in contrast to particular possession10 and is, 
therefore, not a right to a permanent place – it is a right to some place. As one 
can only express their right to freedom if they able to be somewhere, the 
disjunctive right follows directly from the innate right to freedom. The need for this 
right follows from the fact that the Earth is finite and interaction between 
 
9 “Everyone has an innate right to all places on the earth to take one or the other place” 
(Preparatory DoR, AA XXIII, p323).  
10 Division of land according to legal right between citizens. 
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individuals is inevitable. In other words, the disjunctive right is not a right to a 
specific place, but a right to be somewhere.  
 
Thus, the disjunctive right to a place on earth is contained within the innate right 
to freedom and constrained by the finite nature of the earth (Byrd and Hruschka, 
2011, pp 128). 
 
4.2 
The restricting, finite nature of the Earth leads individuals to see themselves as 
part of a universal community, highly likely to interact. This notion of the universal 
community is tied to Kant’s postulate of public right and the obligation to form a 
juridical state.11 Kant references the geography of the Earth several times 
throughout his published work, taking note of the Earth’s finite nature and 
implying that ‘nature has confined [us] together (by virtue of the spherical form [of 
our] location, as globus terraqueus) within specific borders (6:352).’ The 
importance of the finite earth in Kantian philosophy is not the justification of 
interaction between peoples, rather: 
The Earth’s surface is that empirical given space for possible agency within which 
human beings are constrained to articulate their claims to freedom of choice and 
action… the global boundary constitutes an objective given, unavoidable 
condition of empirical reality within the limits of which human agents are 
constrained to establish possible relations of right (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 166).  
The spherical nature of the earth is a ‘circumstance of justice’ that constrains our 
agency in a similar vein to our mortality or physical limitations, as opposed to a 
justification of a right (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 167). The Earth’s finite geography and 
the likelihood of interaction compels individuals to form a civil condition (via the 
postulate of public law)12. If the Earth was an infinite land, then a finite number of 
humans could disperse so as to never interact with each other; however, as this 
is not the case then we, as a community, are in a perpetual state of ‘possible 
interaction (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 129).’ Concerning the word 
‘community’, Kant makes use of the following two terms; communio and 
 
11 From private right in the state of nature there proceeds the postulate of public right: When you 
cannot avoid living side by side with others you ought to leave the state of nature and proceed 
with them into the rightful condition, that is, a condition of distributive justice (MM 6:307). 
12 This will be elucidated later in this chapter. 
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commercium. The definition of communio appears to shift slightly depending on 
who is using the term. For instance, Achenwall uses the word in a legal sense to 
define a community of rights holders. Kant appears to lean into Achenwall’s legal 
use of the term, using communio in reference to a rights holder ‘in the narrow 
sense’ (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 130). On the other hand, Commercium can 
refer to trade and community in general (6:352). The importance of the distinction 
between the two is that communio is not integrally related to the interaction of 
humans, whereas commercium is so related (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 130). 
Kant uses commercium in reference to the internal relations of a community. 
Thus, in using commercium when discussing the original right to a place on Earth, 
Kant is talking about human beings as a global collective, forming a community 
due to the physically possible interaction (commercium) (6:352). The community 
is original because the right each has against the other is the original right to the 
Earth’s surface and is a ‘necessary consequence of our existence on Earth’ (Byrd 
and Hruschka, 2011, pp 131).  
 
As humans live on a finite earth and are highly likely to interact, they form a 
community. This community is commercium in reference to their right as joint 
holders of the land, a right each individual has against the other that gives them 
a right to be some place on Earth. This community is an original community as it 
flows directly from the right to innate freedom. The possibility of interaction 
compels us to follow the postulate of public right and join a civil condition. This 
notion of universal community is, therefore, essential to the Kantian framework of 
rights explored in this chapter. 
 
4.3 
The existence (or postulation) of this commercium of humans also invokes the 
existence (or postulation) of an originally united will. Kant’s explanation of this will 
also has roots in Achenwall’s philosophy. For Achenwall, every society has a 
common goal that determines the common good of that society. Thus, one can 
speak of the society as if it has a will akin to an individual. Kant’s term for this is 
the ‘common will’ (voluntas communis). This fundamental will is present in every 
society but is distinct from the wills of individual members of society. As each 
society has a common will, so does the original community of the earth. As the 
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original community of the earth is a community of commercium, a community with 
claims against each other, the common goal is division of the earth:  
All human beings are originally in common possession of the land on the whole 
earth (communion fundi originaria) with the will (of each) given to them by nature 
to use the land (les iusti), which, because of the naturally unavoidable 
confrontation of choice of each against the choice of the other, would extinguish 
all use of the land if this will did not simultaneously contain the law for choice, 
according to which a particular possession for each can be determined on the 
common land (lex iuridica) (6:352).  
Furthermore, this particular division of the earth is possible only from an originally 
united will:  
The distributive law of mine and thine of each regarding the land can come only 
from an originally and a priori united will according to the axiom of external 
freedom (6:267).  
In other words, for particular possession to be possible, a shared and united will 
must be postulated in authorisation of this division of land. Not only are people in 
possession of a disjunctive right to a place on earth, but this right is also linked 
to a concept of particular possession. This is Kant’s term for the division of land 
according to legal right between citizens, i.e., the conclusive right to private 
property under the formation of a civil condition. This right to particularisation is a 
natural product of disjunctive right. For instance, the disjunctive universal right to 
a place on earth would be rendered academic by the ‘unavoidable conflict of the 
choice of each against the choice of the other.’ Therefore, there is a command to 
divide the earth between humankind (capacity to be the legal owner of things).13*  
 
In sum, Kant’s notion of original possession is grounded in the innate right to 
freedom. In order to express one’s innate right to freedom, one must have a place 
on Earth upon which they can express this autonomy. As everyone has a right to 
a place on earth and wishes to use the land, this would lead to conflict over the 
land. Therefore, practical reason contains the principle of particular possession 
 
13 Kant also dispenses with the possibility that the Earth could be originally free. For, if the land 
were originally free then the freedom of the land would be an absolute prohibition against 
anyone’s use of it. This would contradict with external freedom and put the land beyond any 
possibility of use, rendering it res nullius (and into absurdity). 
* For Kant, ownership is a legal requirement that would also require a juridical state and public 
law.  
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in order to divide the land so it can be used. This requires a priori an originally 
united will and the formation of a civil condition in order to make conclusive that 
which is rightful.  
 
5. The State of Nature  
Due to the reciprocal nature of universal laws, right also requires that I respect 
the claims of others to restrict my use of their objects or their land. It is coercive 
reciprocity that gives rights their content – rights are worthless if they are not 
respected. It is for this reason that Kant argues that it is only by a collective united 
will, accompanied by public law giving and executive authority, that rights can 
become (rightfully) enforced.  
 
Prior to the existence of this conclusively united will, individuals are living in a 
state of nature. The state of nature is a concept that has been explored by several 
philosophers, particularly during the enlightenment period. Kant’s state of nature 
is a state without any juridical order within which to secure or enforce rights. 
(Gregor, 1988, pp 785). The Kantian state of nature is a state in which moral 
agents do have rights by virtue of their humanity, however those rights are merely 
provisional and not secured by law (Gregor, 1988, pp 785). Consequently, an 
agent living in the state of nature possesses private rights provisionally, but it is 
only by entering into a civil condition by which they can secure their rights 
conclusively.  
 
To highlight this more explicitly, we will now return to Kant’s concept of the 
external mine and thine:  
Something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use 
of it even though I am not in possession of it (not holding the object) (6:249).  
This right does exist in the state of nature, but its existence is only provisional. 
For in the state of nature, external objects that are mine or yours are possible. 
Possession, then, which accords with the possibility of a civil condition is 
provisionally rightful possession, but possession actually found in the civil 
condition is conclusive possession (Gregor, 1988, pp 785). Further, it is the 
possibility of ownership that makes it necessary to leave the state of nature and 
form a juridical society:  
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If no acquisition were cognised as rightful even in a provisional way prior to 
entering the civil condition, the civil condition itself would be impossible. For in 
terms of their form, laws concerning what is mine or yours in the state of nature 
contain the same thing they prescribe in the civil condition, insofar as the civil 
condition is thought of by pure rational concepts alone. The difference is only that 
the civil condition provides the conditions under which these laws are put into 
effect (in keeping with distributive justice). – so if external objects were not even 
provisionally mine or yours in the state of nature, there would be no duties of right 
with regard to them and therefore no command to leave the state of nature 
(6:313).   
 
The foregoing quotation highlights the fundamental importance of the concept of 
property and ownership to Kant’s state. Its importance is necessary to the extent 
that if ‘external objects could not be mine or yours’, there would be no duty to 
leave the state of nature and enter into a juridical state (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, 
pp 26). This need for the existence of a civil society in which we can secure our 
rights is what drives Kant to state the Postulate of Public Right or the command 
to enter civil society:  
From private right in the state of nature there proceeds the postulate of public 
right: When you cannot avoid living side by side with others you ought to leave 
the state of nature and proceed with them into the rightful condition, that is, a 
condition of distributive justice (6:307). 
As I mentioned earlier, there needs to be a condition in which we can secure a 
moral agent’s choice in order to make sure it is compatible with everyone’s outer 
freedom. This is the aim of the postulate of public law.14  
 
When discussing ownership in the first section of the Doctrine of Right, Kant 
makes a distinction between two kinds of ownership – provisional and conclusive. 
Provisional ownership is unsecured and effectively amounts to physical 
possession, or possession in which a moral agent’s actual control over an 
external object still amounts to ‘comparatively legal possession (6:257).’ On the 
other hand, conclusive possession is legally secured. Private rights are held in 
the state of nature (a condition without law) but are only held provisionally. In 
 
14 This postulate will become more relevant in chapter three.  
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order to hold rights that are conclusive, one must leave the state of nature and 
form a juridical society.  
 
However, Byrd and Hruschka have raised a potential objection to Kant’s 
justifications for leaving the state of nature (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 139). 
One could argue that external freedom of choice alone and without any 
ownership of external objects of choice is enough to require us to leave the state 
of nature and enter a juridical state in order to secure our freedom (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, pp 139). The answer to this objection follows from the 
aforementioned foundational nature of property to Kant’s juridical state, or more 
specifically, land ownership. As explained in section 4.2, humans form an original 
(prior to any relevant legal act) community in relation to the division of land, and 
it is this relation to the land and community alone that can call forth a united will. 
Without the end and duty to divide the Earth, Byrd and Hruschka argue that there 
would be no original community of human beings – ‘…because the spherical 
surface of the Earth unites all the places on its surface… if its surface were an 
unbounded plane, human beings could be so dispersed on it that they would not 
come into contact with any community with one another, and community would 
not then be a necessary result of their existence on earth… (6:262)’ (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, 140). As Kant says in the Doctrine of Right, ‘original possession 
in common is, rather, a practical rational concept which contains a priori the 
principle in accordance with which alone human beings can use a place on the 
Earth in accordance with principles of right (6:262)’. One could believe that 
humans would still harm each other even without having the duty to divide the 
land and that some of them might wish an end to the violence and demand that 
a juridical state be established. To be able to totally disregard the duty to divide 
land, we would have to assume that problems arising with the scarcity of the land 
did not exist, and this would require one to assume that the earth is an infinite 
plain (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 129). If the earth was indeed an infinite plain, 
then this would allow the pacifist to avoid the warmonger for an infinite amount of 
time; leading to human interaction no longer being unavoidable; meaning that 
leaving the state of nature and forming a juridical state is no longer necessary, 
leaving the postulate of public right sans foundation. From this, we can see that 
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it is the problem of division of land that requires the postulate of public right (Byrd 
and Hruschka, 2011, pp 129).  
 
While there is an obligation to leave the state of nature and form a juridical state, 
Kant is clear that it is not wrong to continue to live in the state of nature. When 
one lives in the state of nature, they have already agreed to ‘the rules’ of the state 
of nature, or at least are aware of the state of being in which they live and are 
therefore not being wronged by neighbours during conflicts, assuming the 
neighbours are also in the state of nature: 
It is true that the state of nature need not, just because it is natural, be a state of 
injustice (iniustus), of dealing with one another only in terms of the degree of 
force each has. But it would still be a state devoid of justice (status iustitia 
vacuus), in which, when rights are in dispute (ius controversum), there would be 
no judge competent to render a verdict having rightful force. Hence each may 
impel the other by force to leave this state and enter into a rightful condition 
(6:312).  
Consequently, a state of nature is not necessarily an unjust or barbaric state, it is 
simply a state without the means to enforce right if those rights were to come into 
dispute. This lack of justice in the state of nature appears, therefore, to justify the 
use of force in coercing moral agents sharing a state of nature to form a civil 
condition.  
 
Kant’s state of nature then is not a state in which any form of order doesn’t exist 
but is instead a state of being in which the civil condition does not yet exist. This 
is not to say that there are no rights in the state of nature, there are still natural 
laws, the only caveat is that those laws are not secured and are therefore held 
provisionally. For these rights to become conclusive, one must follow the 
postulate of public right, submit to public laws, and form a juridical society.  
 
6. United Will and the Civil Condition  
So far, the state of nature and its inability to secure a moral agent’s rights 
conclusively have been discussed. It is from this that moral agents have an 
obligation, as rational beings, to leave the state of nature (according to the 
postulate of public right) and form a civil society. As shown, private right exists in 
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the state of nature, but there can be no public right; that is, rights cannot be 
conclusive in the state of nature. 
 
In the civil condition, however, there exists both private and public rights; to have 
both is dependent on public or distributive justice (coercion). Before explaining 
Kant’s concept of the civil condition, one must delve deeper into the concept of 
the public right or law. Kant states that one can only have rightful, external 
possession “under an authority giving laws publicly (6:256)”. Kant goes on to 
state that:  
A unilateral will cannot serve as a coercive law for everyone with regard to 
possession that is external and therefore contingent, since that would infringe 
upon freedom in accordance with universal laws. So, it is only a will putting 
everyone under obligation, hence only a collective general (common) and 
powerful will that can provide everyone with this assurance (6:256).  
 
For Kant, the condition of being subject to a general external lawgiving 
accompanied with the power to enforce these laws is the civil condition, which is 
why Kant states that “only in the civil condition can something external be mine 
or yours (6:256)”. The civil condition doesn’t rewrite the rights previously held in 
the state of nature, it codifies them in law. As Kant states, the totality of statutes 
that need to be announced to the public in order to create a juridical state is public 
law.’ This can be seen more clearly when returning to Kant’s fundamental 
discussion of property rights discussed in section three. My possession over a 
thing requires a ‘constant act of possession’. If my possession of an object is to 
become enforceable it requires a ‘public ownership of possession’ or a ‘publicly 
valid sign of documentation of my possession’, and this would require some kind 
of certification (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 31). Kant’s idea of public law in the 
juridical state, then, flows from his concept of private law in the state of nature.  
 
For Kant, the purpose of public law is simply to secure individual rights (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, pp 144). Consequently, we have the same rights compared to 
that which can be conceived in the state of nature15, the only difference being 
 
15 Kant also allows for introduction of new positive laws as societies develop – their introduction 
is fine so long as they do not conflict with natural law rights. 
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that these rights have been made public and secured by the united will of the 
people and the state: 
When people are under a civil condition, the statutory laws obtaining in this 
condition cannot infringe upon natural right (i.e., that right which can be derived 
from a priori principles for a civil constitution); and so the rightful principle 
“whoever acts on a maxim by which it becomes impossible to have an object of 
choice as mine wrongs me”, remains in force. For a civil constitution is just the 
rightful condition, by which what belongs to each is only secured, but not actually 
settled and determined (6:257).  
Private law is the idea that ‘everyone follows his own judgement.’ The juridical 
state, on the other hand, is a state of public law; particularly, a state in which 
those private rights in the state of nature have been codified and are now legally 
coercible.  
 
Kant’s analysis of the juridical state encompasses three types of justice 
implemented through three distinct human-made public institutions that serve and 
are available to everyone (Williams, 1983, pp 171-172). Legislative – the arm of 
government that sets the laws of the land; Executive/Sovereign (iustitia 
commutativa) – the arm of government that executes the will of the legislative; 
Judicial (iustitia distributiva) – The decisions of the judiciary are binding and final. 
They decide our rights in cases of dispute. The three institutions are necessary 
conditions for the creation of a juridical state; Kant states that public justice is the 
formal principle of the possibility of a juridical state.  
 
6.1 
The first arm of the state, the legislative body, can ‘only belong to the united will 
of the people (6:313)’. The reasoning behind this is that all right flows from this 
united will and if the united will decides upon a law, then no wrong can be done 
by that law. Only the general united will of the people can be legislative (6:313-
4)’. This appears to be problematic upon first reading, as it appears that Kant is 
suggesting that every law of the state must be agreed upon unanimously before 
it becomes law. However, what is being proposed is the very ideal of Kant’s 
legislative body. Kant is not suggesting that literal consensus on every law will be 
possible or necessary in order to run a functional republic. 
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6.2 
The second institution of public justice, executive body, is so named as it protects 
our natural rights by making them public and therefore coercible (Williams, 1983, 
pp 171). While it may, at first, appear to be contrary to Kant’s axiom of outer 
freedom to have an element of ‘coercibility’ in law, the two are compatible. If a 
freedom is a hindrance in accordance with universal laws, coercion is opposed 
to this and (hindering the hindrance) is consistent with freedom, in accordance 
with universal laws (6:231). For instance, if I own a house my ownership would 
be academic if I could not enforce my right to live in that house.  
 
This means that in the juridical state natural law, made up of only a priori 
principles, is applicable only after it has been formulated and published – or 
codified into positive law16 (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 34). Throughout the 
Doctrine of Right, Kant refers to positive law, fulfilling the requirements of which 
is significant for determining which rights moral agents possess. For instance, 
Kant repeatedly states that the owner of an external object must exercise 
constant possession of that object through documentation of that ownership, and 
failure to do so will result in legal consequences – ‘one who fails to document his 
act of possession’ is liable to lose her ownership through adverse possession. 
Thomas Pogge notes that positive law irons out the incompleteness of the natural 
laws, by empirically selecting one system of constraints from among those that 
satisfy pure practical reason (Pogge, 1988, pp 414). This ‘ironing out of 
incompleteness’ is the juridical state giving an official statement on what is just in 
a variety of different situations. The executive, then, allows a central legislative 
institution to complement the constraints of natural law.  
 
So positive law, as laid down by protective justice, is a form of law containing a 
priori principles of reason about what a law is but gives these principles an effect 





16 It’s worth highlighting here that positive law can go beyond natural law, but positive law 
cannot contradict natural law.  
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6.3 
The final requirement of the juridical state is the state judiciary. This form of justice 
is distributive justice, meaning that this institution decides and determines what 
is established as right, therefore distributing or assigning rights to individuals 
when those rights are being disputed (Williams, 1983, pp 172). This form of 
justice is the ‘justice of a country’ and the existence of such a justice can be called 
the most important of all juridical issues. Juridical justice involves both civil courts 
(civil justice) and criminal courts (criminal justice). As Kant often notes in the 
Doctrine of Right, the state of nature is a state without justice, as there is no 
judiciary to decide with binding force in cases of dispute over our rights (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, pp 39).  
 
The juridical state then, is a state in which the institutions of legislative, executive, 
and the judiciary are combined to form a public law or right, protecting and 
securing a moral agent’s rights. If all three of these institutions do not exist, then 
a state is not a juridical state.  
 
The Kantian juridical state, then, is made up of three distinct powers that share 
the job of governing the state equally. The legislative decides the laws, the 
executive enforces the laws, and the judiciary preside over matters of justice.  
 
7. State in the Idea 
The presentation of the juridical state so far has specified the minimum 
requirements for a state to be considered juridical; that is, they are the 
requirements a state needs to have in place in order for citizens to be able to 
enjoy their rights securely.  
 
Kant also describes the concept of a state with ideal constitutional principles. This 
state is referred to as the state ‘as it is supposed to be according to pure principles 
of law, which provides the norm for every actual union to form a commonwealth 
(6:313)’ (the state in the idea). Thus, there can be many different types of juridical 
state still securing the rights of the citizen. Nevertheless, there can only be one 
state in the idea, a state that is perfect in every manner. This idea will become 
important in our later discussion as it is important to remember that Kant gave 
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examples of ideal scenarios, not as literal goals to achieve, but as ends to aim 
for and get as close to as possible. Furthermore, the discussion on Kant’s disdain 
for despotism will also have a bearing on the discussion of the cosmopolitan law 
in the third and fourth chapters. While the practicality of actually creating the 
perfect state is non-existent, there remains a duty on the behalf of the state to 
strive towards constitutional perfection and to get as close as possible to this 
ideal.  
 
One way in which we can understand the distinction between the state as an idea 
and the judicial state is to examine Kant’s questioning of the ideal lawgiver. Kant 
states that:  
The legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people. For since 
all right is to proceed from it, it can not do anyone wrong by its law (6:313).  
This means that the citizens of a state, or those eligible to vote, will have to vote 
for a piece of legislation unanimously. Kant’s line of reasoning behind the 
requirement of unanimity comes from the idea of volenti non fit iniuria (to the 
consenting, no wrong happens). Kant, however, understands that such an ideal 
is impossible in any state existing at his time, or the time of writing this thesis; so, 
Kant asserts that any juridical state:  
Therefore, only a majority of the votes, not directly from the voting population (in 
a large people) but only from a delegation as representatives of the people, is all 
that can be foreseen as attainable (8:350). 
That being said, the existing juridical state has the duty to aim for a constitution 
as close as possible to the perfection in the ideal state. Even if the ideal state is 
impossible, governments must ‘gradually and continually’ update its constitution 
so that it ‘harmonises’ with the ‘only constitution that accords with right’ (6:340).  
 
The discussion on Kant’s ideal state and the powers it should have is not 
complete without mentioning his ideal forms of government and sovereign. In 
Perpetual Peace, Kant highlights two important functions of government: the form 
of sovereignty and the form of government. The form of sovereignty is concerned 
with the ruler of the state and Kant puts forward the ‘traditional’ three forms of 
rule: the rule by one person, rule by a group of people, or rule by all people. Kant’s 
position on his ideal form of sovereignty changes slightly between the publication 
 34 
of Perpetual Peace in 1795 and the Metaphysics of Morals in 1797. In Perpetual 
Peace, Kant rejects democracy out of hand as it would “necessarily” lead to 
despotism. Kant’s reasoning here is that the legislative and executive bodies of 
power would not be separated, and this would necessarily lead to despotism. 
Nevertheless, he is also not entirely favourably disposed to the first two forms of 
sovereignty either. Kant favours a form of representative legislature in which the 
power to remove or appoint an executive power is contained. Therefore, 
democracy, according to Kant, is a form of sovereignty in which the people 
command both the executive and the legislative powers. The representation that 
Kant favours is that the united will of the people fulfil the role of the legislative 
branch, adopting the principles, and the executive is the branch that carries out 
these principles – ruling the state.  
 
When it comes to the form of government, Kant writes of only two options: 
republicanism and despotism. Kant rejects despotism out of hand, as it is a state 
in which the ruler does not represent the people over which he rules. On the other 
hand, a republican government is described as being one in which the executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies are separated. This prevents the issues seen in 
the despotic government as it prevents the three bodies of government from 
interfering with each other and/or cherry picking their applications. Kant states 
that government must be republican in his first definitive article for perpetual 
peace. There is also a duty that rulers must “…govern in a republican… manner, 
even although they may rule autocratically.” This means that even if one rules a 
state in which a republican constitution does not exist, it is still the case that the 
ruler must legislate and govern as a representative of the people (Bielefeldt, 
1997, pp 551-552). The ruler, then, must legislate in a manner that anticipates 
the people’s republican self-legislation and paves the way for achieving an actual 
republican constitution. A non-republican state is only provisionally legitimate, 
which will be vanquished as soon as a true republican state is established 
(Bielefeldt, 1997, pp 551).  
 
Kant’s ideal form of government, then, is a republican constitution with some form 
of representation of the people. This may not be a democracy as we would 
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understand it, but something relatively close to it that gives representation to the 
people without leading to a dictatorship of the people.  
 
In sum, Kant’s practical philosophy flows from the innate right to external 
freedom. It is this right that unfolds into the universal principle of right, property 
rights, and then the obligation to form a juridical state. This chapter will act as the 
map which the following chapter will use as a guide in constructing its refugee 
right. Any future account of refugee right must mesh with the principles of right 
presented in this chapter. For instance, a refugee right must be clearly drawn 
from freedom and compatible with the universal principle of right. Now that this 
framework of rights has been introduced, the construction of a Kantian refugee 




Chapter Two:  Refugee Right in Kant 
 
Chapter One focussed on the foundational aspects of Kant’s Doctrine of Right. 
For Kant, Right is concerned with external actions rather than internal motivations 
for actions and it is this that will become important in the upcoming discussion on 
refugee right. The issue of refugee right has become a pressing subject in recent 
years. The beginning of the Syrian Civil War was notably important in triggering 
a discussion on the scope of refugee right, particularly within Europe. As a 
consequence of the war, millions of Syrians were displaced with the majority 
fleeing to nearby Lebanon and Jordan, as well as around one million fleeing to 
Europe. In addition to Syrian refugees, Rohingyan refugees have also made 
headlines following attacks by Buddhist militias in Myanmar. While political 
refugees are headline-worthy, there is also the potential for climate refugees 
becoming far more common as the profound consequences of climate change 
begin to take effect. A Kantian discussion of refugee right is thus overdue.  This 
chapter offers an account of refugee right that I find to be inherent within Kant’s 
moral and political philosophy. In other words, while Kant did not explicitly offer 
an account of ‘refugee right’, there is more than enough scope for a refugee right 
to exist within his political philosophy. In giving an account of Kantian refugee 
right, this chapter will build upon the foundations presented in Chapter One, 
ensuring the account is consistent with innate freedom and right.  Of key 
importance will be Kant’s treatment of cosmopolitan right and the law of 
hospitality.  This chapter will find, furthermore, that honouring the fundamental 
tenets of Kant’s philosophy of right requires that the concept of refugee right that 
emerges is a necessarily modest one.  I will propose a specific content for this 
concept of refugee right which I find to be consistent with Kant’s overall 
framework of principles.   
 
1. Cosmopolitan Right and the Law of Hospitality 
While the focus of the prior chapter was on individual rights and the domestic 
state, Kant also explored wider areas of right that included international and 
cosmopolitan right. Across Kant’s Doctrine of Right and Perpetual Peace are 
descriptions of a three-pillared structure of public right:  
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…in all three areas of public right – public, international, and cosmopolitan right… 
(8:349).   
Public right refers to domestic law, international law refers to the rights of states, 
and the cosmopolitan right, broadly, refers to the rights of peoples. Within 
Perpetual Peace, Kant includes three definitive articles of perpetual peace 
(DAPPs), each one of which correlates to a pillar of public right. The first DAPP 
requires that all states become republican (8:349).17 This requires that individuals 
form a civil condition within which they may self-legislate and hold conclusive 
rights. The second DAPP is concerned with international law (8:354), and the 
third - with cosmopolitan right (8:357).18 The cosmopolitan right’s role in this 
tripartite structure changes between the publications of Perpetual Peace and the 
Doctrine of Right. Consequently, I will divide this section into two subsections in 
order to address both interpretations as closely as possible.  
 
1.1 Hospitality in Perpetual Peace  
Towards Perpetual Peace was the first of Kant’s mature published works to 
include a specific reference to cosmopolitan right. This incarnation of 
cosmopolitan right was a hybrid of hospitality and the right to trade. The DAPP 
opens, however, with the following statement:  
Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Here, as 
in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of right, so that 
hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with 
hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him 
away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves 
peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility (8:357-359).  
 
It is implicit within the foregoing quote that one cannot turn away a visitor should 
it result in the death of that visitor. This notion of hospitality will have more 
important ramifications when the content of refugee right will be explored later in 
this chapter. However, Kant also uses hospitality here to argue for trade between 
peoples, as well as to critique the current wave of colonialism that was emanating 
 
17 First definitive article of perpetual peace: the civil constitution of every state shall be 
republican (8:349). 
18 Domestic and international law will be explained further in the final two chapters as I explore 
the implementation of a refugee right.  
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from certain nations. With reference to trade, Kant believes that the presence of 
trade wards off the advance of war: 
The commercial spirit cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later it takes 
possession of every nation. For, of all the forces which lie at the command of a 
state, the power of money is probably the most reliable (8:368).  
 
Embedded within the cosmopolitan right, then, is the ability to facilitate the 
‘thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others of offering to engage in commerce 
with any other… (6:352)’ by giving security to those that wish to open doors of 
communication and trade with foreigners. The reasoning behind this is that Kant 
sees the ability to trade with other states as being a necessary factor in achieving 
perpetual peace (Cavallar, 2015, pp 27). Not only because trade appeals to the 
self-interest of nations, meaning that a state would not want to declare war as it 
less beneficial than trading with that state; but also, because the very nature of 
trade requires interaction and a common interest (8:368). Much like the existence 
of the public market in the domestic level and its importance within the state, there 
must exist the possibility something similar in the international theatre. The public 
market on the domestic level serves, not only to exchange property, but also to 
facilitate needs and interaction, as well as to exchange thoughts through 
publishing (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 209).19  
 
In addition, Kant’s treatment of cosmopolitan right was careful not to fall into 
justifications of colonialism. Kant was clear in saying that hospitality was a right 
to only visit, rather than to settle:  
What he can claim is not the right to be a guest (for this is a special beneficent 
pact would be required, making him a member of the household for a certain 
time), but the right to visit; this right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all 
human beings by virtue of the right of common possession of the earth’s 
surface… (8:358). 
Kant was lucid in suggesting this right to visit was justified in not overextending 
to a right to settle, pointing to the actions of ‘the civilised nations’ (8:358):  
If one compares [the right to seek commerce] with the inhospitable behaviour of 
civilised, especially commercial, states in our own part of the world, the injustice 
 
19 See chapter one for more information on the domestic public market.  
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they show in visiting foreign lands and peoples (which is tantamount to 
conquering them) goes to horrifying lengths (8:358).  
Kant then goes on to list the atrocities that have been committed in the East 
Indies, the Cape, and the Spice Islands in order to highlight the importance of a 
right to visit only and a right to only present oneself. As a result, hospitality is 
reciprocal. Kant defends both China and Japan’s restrictive dealings with foreign 
traders, specifically referencing Japan’s exclusive Dutch trading policy that 
restricted the Dutch from entering the country and interacting with the local 
population (8:359). Kleingeld adds to this, highlighting Kant’s point that China and 
Japan had both tried contact with European traders before and wanted to avoid 
the ‘litany of troubles’ that resulted. (8:359; Kleingeld, 1998, pp 77).  
 
So, the account of Perpetual Peace introduces hospitality as part of cosmopolitan 
right, itself a part of public right, and highlights the importance of trade. It argues 
that trade is important to peace, believing that, in a classical liberal framework, 
war and trade cannot coexist. In this sense, Kant is appealing to the self-interest 
of nations, believing that they will opt for trade rather than peace, as it will be far 
more beneficial.  
 
1.2 Hospitality in the Doctrine of Right 
The ‘Doctrine of Right’ was published after Perpetual Peace, allowing us to 
understand how Kant’s notions of cosmopolitan right have changed and matured. 
The publication of the ‘Doctrine of Right’ appears to shift the focus of hospitality 
into international law, removing it from the realm of cosmopolitan right (Byrd and 
Hruschka, 2011, pp 208). There is no reference to hospitality within the section 
on cosmopolitan right, but there are several references to a right to visit scattered 
throughout the Doctrine of Right (6:352). This shows us that, rather than 
abandoning the concept altogether, Kant instead believed that it was better suited 
to the realm of international law than cosmopolitan law (Byrd and Hruschka, 
2011, pp 208). The reason for this is that cosmopolitan law, as Kant specifies in 
this publication, is concerned with the rights of peoples:  
This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all peoples with a view to 
certain universal laws for their possible commerce, can be called cosmopolitan 
right (ius cosmopoliticum) (6:352).  
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That is, cosmopolitan law is not a law concerned with individuals, but instead with 
the rights of a people (as a group) to offer themselves to each other for commerce 
(Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 209). The ends in the Doctrine of Right, however, 
are the same as the ends in Perpetual Peace – to put an end to war. Despite 
highlighting the importance of trade to world peace, Kant is quick to limit the right 
to visit and trade in the Doctrine of Right: 
…the right of citizens of the world to try to establish community with all and… to 
visit all regions of the Earth… this is not a right to make a settlement on the land 
of another nation (ius incolatus) for this, a specific contract is required (6:353). 
Kant was, again, limiting the right to visit in order to prohibit the colonisation that 
was prevalent in Kant’s time. This prohibition against colonialism is ‘true despite 
the fact that sufficient specious reasons to justify the use of force are available: 
that is, it is to the world’s advantage because these crude people will become 
civilised’ (6:353). 
 
The main similarity in how the cosmopolitan right is presented across its two 
incarnations is its importance to trade. Both PP and DR highlight the need for 
trade between nations and both argue that trade will help facilitate a condition of 
peace. Another factor that remains the same is the condemnation of colonialism. 
This highlights that one cannot just take what one wishes from another nation or 
move there without permission. However, one notable difference between the 
two versions of cosmopolitan right is the law of hospitality. Kant explains in 
Perpetual Peace that one cannot turn away a stranger should it result in their 
death, but in the Doctrine of Right, this is omitted from the discussion on 
cosmopolitan right. 
 
2. Refugee Right and the Law of Hospitality 
The prior section revealed that there is a law of hospitality contained within the 
cosmopolitan right of Perpetual Peace. This law stated that it is a matter of right 
that a state is not able to turn away a visitor if they are unable to return to their 
home state. Such a statement has clear relevance to any Kantian discussion on 
refugee rights. It is important to remember that refugees are not a recent 
occurrence. Even in Kant’s time, people were fleeing across state borders to 
avoid religious persecution, war, and oppression (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 53). As a 
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matter of fact, Kant’s Prussia had admitted tens of thousands of refugees. While 
Kleingeld notes that this was in part done to increase population, it still shows 
that Kant would have been aware of the plight of refugees (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 
53). Before discussing the connection between the law of hospitality and refugee 
right, the law of hospitality ought to be restated here:  
Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. Here, as 
in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of right, so that 
hospitality (hospitableness) means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with 
hostility because he has arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him 
away, if this can be done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves 
peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility (8:357-359).  
This quote will be analysed in depth in order to extrapolate the foundation of 
Kantian refugee right, a principle of non-refoulement. Consequently, this section 
will be divided into three subsections: the definition of a refugee, the structure of 
refugee right, and the connections of this right to the innate right to freedom.  
 
2.1 Definition of a Refugee 
There are currently two terms that are often used interchangeably in 
contemporary discussions concerning the rights of those fleeing foreign nations 
– asylum seekers and refugees. While the two terms are often used 
interchangeably, there is an important difference between them. Amnesty 
International defines an asylum seeker as an individual seeking international 
protection without a finalised claim for their right to stay in a particular country. 
Whereas a refugee is an individual with a finalised claim who has fled their home 
state and is unable to return home due to threats of persecution. The United 
Nations’ Refugee Convention of 1951 defines a refugee as being:  
Someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.20 
Amnesty International gave a neat summary with the following, ‘not every asylum 
seeker will be a refugee, but every refugee has been an asylum seeker.’21 When 
one is granted refugee protections, they become recipients of certain obligations 
 
20 (2017). Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. [online] UNHCR. 
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/3b66c2aa10 [Accessed 7 Nov. 2017]. 
21 Ibid 
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from the host state. The UN’s refugee charter requires that a refugee be treated 
according to the principles of non-discrimination, non-penalisation, and non-
refoulement. Non-discrimination forbids refugees from being treated differently 
depending on their race, gender, sexuality, or disability.22 The non-refoulement 
aspect of the convention contains safeguards against the expulsion of refugees. 
It states that ‘no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her 
will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where they fear threat to life or 
freedom.’23  
The modern account of a refugee right, then, is broadly built around the principle 
of non-discrimination and non-refoulement. While Kant does not explicitly 
reference refugees in the discussion on hospitality, there is an implicit conception 
of non-refoulement within the law of hospitality, as the law states ‘the other can 
turn him away, if this can be done without destroying him…(8:357-359)’ The 
negative of this section implies that foreigners cannot be turned away if doing so 
would lead to their death, although this chapter will also explore the broader 
meaning of ‘destruction’ that could include life-denying persecution.  
 
2.2 The Nature of Refugee Right 
The first chapter of this thesis focussed on Kant’s account of right and external 
freedom. For Kant, right is concerned with external actions rather than internal 
motivations for acting. An important element of the law of hospitality is that Kant 
explicitly connects hospitality to right and not to philanthropy, an assertion that 
Kant repeats in the Doctrine of Right: 
This rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community of 
all nations on the Earth that can come into relations affecting one another is not 
a philanthropic (ethical) principle but a principle having to do with rights (6:352). 
 
If refugee right is to be correctly characterised as a strict right, according to Kant’s 
criteria of strict right it must be shown to be compatible with external freedom and 
involve some kind of reciprocity. Ben Laurence refers to the structure of strict, 
juridical right as the ‘mine and yours’ structure (Laurence, 2018, pp 9). As shown 





with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law’ (Laurence, 2018, 
pp 9). Kant then draws the Universal Principle of Right from this, suggesting that 
any action is right if and only if it can be harmonised with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law. In other words, if James performs an action that 
is compatible with the freedom of others and Jessica chooses to hinder this 
action, Jessica’s action is unable to be harmonised with the freedom of everyone 
in accordance with a universal law. Kant ties these notions to the idea of coercion. 
While it is wrong to coerce those acting in accordance with the principle of right, 
it isn’t wrong to coerce a wrongdoer, for this would be hindering a hindrance to 
the freedom of others in accordance with a universal law (Laurence, 2018, pp 2). 
So, as per the arguments in Chapter One, right is also intimately connected to 
coercion and this is where Kant’s notions of strict rights become more lucid. 
Kant’s strict right is ‘represented as the possibility of a fully reciprocal use of 
coercion that is consistent with everyone’s freedom in accordance with universal 
laws’ (6:231). These strict rights are not ‘mingled with anything ethical’ and 
require ‘only external grounds for determining choice’. So, a ‘completely external 
right’ can be ‘called strict (right in the narrow sense)’. This also includes an 
obligation, from which Kant suggests that the universal law of right is ‘a law that 
lays an obligation on me’, but it is not a law that means I ‘should limit my freedom 
to those conditions for the sake of this obligation’; rather, ‘freedom is limited to 
those conditions in conformity with the idea of it and that it may also be actively 
limited by others’ (6:231). In constructing an implicit account of refugee right in 
Kant, we will need to highlight how such a right can be universal (compatible with 
everyone’s freedom), coercible, and reciprocal. The universal nature of a refugee 
right can be seen in the aforementioned law of hospitality. Kant does write that 
the law of hospitality is part of the domain of Recht and that it is universal 
hospitality which implies that it does indeed apply to everyone.  
 
Consequently, the issue at hand in this chapter will be what rights a person who 
happens to be a refugee (a condition which could befall any one of us) has 
against the host states to which they travel, in terms of their treatment. Citizens 
possess rights as citizens of their home state. However, refugees are people who 
may or may not have been citizens of the state in which they have lived but are 
forced by circumstances to flee their home state. Loss of freedoms in their original 
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state of residence, forcing them to flee, results in their losing their right to a place 
on Earth, essential to freedom according to the principle of right. Refugees are 
forced to find some other place to live. The need to do so has a basis in their 
fundamental right as a human being to have a place on Earth to live. What this 
right may entail specifically when applied to refugees will become clearer in the 
following subsection.  The preliminary conclusion to be drawn from Kant here 
then is not that he proposes a ‘refugee right’ per se, rather that he proclaims a 
universal and original right to a place on Earth by virtue of our humanity for whom 
freedom is the sole intrinsic right, and this also applies to refugees. 
 
2.3 Freedom, Original Possession, and Refugee Right 
In Chapter One I introduced Kant’s notion of the original right to a place on the 
Earth. This right to a place on earth is necessary for individuals to express their 
innate right to freedom to set and pursue legitimate ends. As explained in the 
Doctrine of Right, one can only have rights as autonomous agents if one has a 
place on earth upon which to express those rights:  
All men are originally (i.e., prior to any act that establishes a right) in a possession 
of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be wherever 
nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them. This kind of possession 
(possessio) – which is to be distinguished from residence (sedes), a chosen and 
therefore an acquired lasting possession – is possession in common because 
the spherical surface of the earth unites all the places on its surface… The 
possession of the earth in common which precedes any acts of theirs that would 
establish rights… is an original possession in common… original possession in 
common is, rather, a practical rational concept which contains a priori the 
principle in accordance with which alone men can use a place on the earth in 
accordance with principles of right. (6:262). 
 
The above highlights the universal nature of the right to common possession of 
the Earth’s surface, illustrating that it gives all individuals the right to be wherever 
nature or chance has placed them. As Flikschuh observes, the spherical nature 
of the Earth is ‘made up of individual spaces’ all of which represent ‘equally valid 
claims to external freedom (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 144)’. From the idea of original 
possession in common, obligations are ‘originally acquired’, placing us ‘under 
obligations of justice to one another’ from our entrance into the world (Flikschuh, 
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2000, pp 157). In Perpetual Peace Kant explicitly connects the law of hospitality 
to this right of common possession of the Earth’s surface:  
This right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings by virtue of 
the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface on which, as a sphere, 
they cannot disperse infinitely but must finally put up with being near one another; 
but originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth 
(8:358).  
This section will make the argument that since the law of hospitality is connected 
directly to the right to original possession of the Earth, the law of hospitality is 
justified by the innate right to freedom. Consequently, this chapter will conclude 
that, if a state were to expel a refugee from a stretch of land leaving them nowhere 
safely to go, it would violate that individual’s right to freedom, via their original 
right to possession of the Earth.  
 
In this section I highlight both the importance of the original right to a place on 
earth to be for realisation of an individual’s intrinsic right to freedom; and the fact 
that a refugee’s decision to depart from one place on earth for another is not in 
itself a free choice but arises from a necessity derived from denial of intrinsic 
freedom in the place they originally happen to be, in order to be able to express 
freedom in another place. In examining these ideas, a distinction between 
refugees, asylum seekers, and economic migrants will be drawn. 
 
It is important to acknowledge the existence of economic migrants in any 
discussion surrounding refugee right, as economic migrants will clash 
significantly with the quote raised earlier, that ‘all men are originally… in 
possession of land that is in conformity with right, that is, they have a right to be 
wherever nature or chance (apart from their will) has placed them’. An economic 
migrant is an individual who uses a refugee flow or crisis in order to move from 
one country to another, usually for economic or lifestyle gain. This means that, in 
the case of economic migrants, they haven’t ended up in another country as a 
result of ‘nature or chance’. Many cases of ‘economic migrants’ also comprise 
the customers of people smugglers, where individuals deliberately destroy 
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identification papers24 that would undermine refugee claims and pay smugglers 
to gain entry into a country, expecting their asylum application to be falsely 
processed in that state.25 The UN specifies that people smuggling is the act of 
procuring illegal entry of a person into a state with an end of material or financial 
gain.26 This separates it from an individual helping another into a state for 
altruistic purposes.  
 
One could argue that economic migrants as so defined freely exercise will in their 
decision to leave their original state and it is, therefore, not chance or nature that 
has placed them in another state. Reasons why people turn to people smugglers 
can vary from the taking advantage of wealth to bypass immigration laws, to 
desperation after arriving in countries of first call that do not subscribe to the 
refugee convention.27   
 
Consequently, more content is needed to bridge the gap between the original 
right to a place on Earth and refugee right. Fortunately, the existence of economic 
migrants helps to shed further light on the phrase ‘nature or chance’ by raising 
the important distinction between an action and a free action. To be somewhere 
by ‘nature or chance’ suggests not by one’s own free choice.  To be somewhere 
by ‘nature or chance’ would encompass the contingency of parentage and place 
of birth (nature), but also include accidental displacements or human movements 
or decisions to move caused or influenced by natural disturbances or arbitrary 
violence (chance).  In either case, the agent themselves has not initiated or freely 
chosen to be where they are, or to move from where they were.  On the other 
hand, a free action requires the individual exercise of will (6:222) wherein it is 
practical reason qua willkür that determines an agent’s actions, not fear, nor 
external physical pressure or life-threatening extremity. Economic migrants 
appear to be those who make free choices, for expedient or prudential reasons 
 
24 While the deliberate act of lying is frowned upon in Kantian philosophy, it is important to 
remember that, at least in some cases, these asylum seekers are being led astray by people 
smugglers and used as a means to their own economic end.  
25 This is important in the EU as the Treaty of Dublin requires the state of first contact to process 
asylum.  
26 Ohchr.org. (2019). OHCHR | Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. [online] Available 
at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/TransnationalOrganizedCrime.aspx 
[Accessed 19 May 2019]. 
27 As is the case in Malaysia and Indonesia.  
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of their own but in the absence of conditions of extremity, to leave their home 
countries in order to benefit from moving to another country, and who seek to do 
so in disregard of the immigration laws of the target country. Genuine refugees, 
however, typically have made coerced and stressful decisions to leave their home 
country to seek refuge in another. Coercive forces may include existential threats 
against life, threats against family, or religious persecution. In the troubling case 
of people smuggling of asylum seekers who are genuine would-be refugees the 
smugglers prey on the desperation of the asylum seekers as a means to their 
own material end and often to the detriment of the asylum seeker. While it is can 
be difficult for governments to determine the difference between the two in 
practical terms, there are clear theoretical differences with regards to the original 
right to a place on Earth.   
 
Let’s return to Kant’s own example of hospitality involving a shipwrecked mariner. 
The sailor embarked on a journey (free action) and (through chance or irresistible 
physical force) became stuck in another state, requiring hospitality. This would 
also apply to the case of a fleeing refugee, as the threat of death or persecution 
would qualify as irresistible force.28  A refugee may choose to leave their state, 
but it not as a free or voluntary action.29 This emphasis on free action is 
highlighted even more in the unpublished draft of Perpetual Peace:  
Whoever is involuntarily caused to end up there [viz., with another people]… 
cannot be chased away from the beach or the oasis where he saved himself and 
sent back into imminent danger, nor can he be captured; instead, he must be 
able to stay there until there is a favourable opportunity to leave (23:173).  
 
Katrin Flikschuh raised a parallel argument to illustrate this right to original 
possession using the example of the squatter (a person who unlawfully occupies 
an uninhabited building or unused land) (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 156). A squatter 
 
28 ‘Innate equality, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in 
turn bind them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as 
being a human being beyond reproach (iusti), since before he performs any act affecting rights 
he has done no wrong to anyone (6:237).’ 
29 One could argue that a refugee has a right to be somewhere but does not necessarily have a 
claim upon a particular stretch of land. In other words, a refugee has a right to flee their home 
state but not a right to claim right of residence in another country. The vagueness of a ‘right to 
someplace’ is undoubtedly an issue with Kant’s law of hospitality, but the distribution of 
refugees will be discussed later in this thesis.   
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does not rent or own the land on which they reside and can therefore be moved 
from the land without any notice. Squatters are, therefore, susceptible to the 
choices of others and thereby denied their right to a place on the Earth (Flikschuh, 
2000, pp 156). Without Kant’s right to a place on Earth, Flikschuh writes that we 
would all be ‘in the situation of a squatter who gets pushed from place to place 
(Flikschuh, 2000, pp 156). A place on Earth is something which one acquires, not 
through an act of will, but through ‘a blameless acquisition’ (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 
156): 
In doing so, no one has derived their place on the earth from what was someone 
else’s: each person’s acquisition of a place on the earth is original in virtue of the 
fact that it is they who occupy it (Flikschuh, 2000, pp 157).  
 
Flikschuh offers her example of the squatter to highlight the importance of an 
individual’s right to a place on earth, an idea central to my own construction of a 
refugee right. That being said, Flikschuh’s squatter case sheds limited light on 
refugee right. The squatter is not necessarily bereft of an alternative place to be, 
as would be the case for the refugee if their refugee status is not recognised. In 
the case of the refugee, the individual has nowhere from which they can express 
their right to freedom. If the refugee had to leave their own land due to fear of 
death, to send them back would lead to their death. Whereas a squatter need not 
have their right to freedom directly restricted. Some young people engage in 
squatting because they have chosen to opt out of society and social welfare or to 
make a political point. There is no fear of death should a squatter be moved on 
from a property. In other words, a squatter is being denied particular possession 
of the Earth, whereas a refugee is being denied someplace on Earth.  
 
The fact that a refugee does not have a right to permanent residency allows for 
further connections between the law of hospitality and the disjunctive right to a 
place on Earth. As earlier noted, the disjunctive right is merely a ‘right to some 
place’ (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, 128-129). Similarly, the right to hospitality is 
also not a right to permanent habitation. For ‘a right to make settlement on the 
land of another nation (ius incolatus); for this, a special contract is required 
(8:358)’. While Kant does not go into detail about the nature of this ‘special 
contract’, it is important for two reasons. The first is that it shows a colonial power 
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must make a treaty with an indigenous people, highlighting Kant’s opposition to 
the colonialism of the time. The second is that this special contract raises the 
question of how it would apply to refugees (and immigration as a whole). For 
instance, for a refugee to receive the right to permanent residency, would they 
have to learn their new country’s language, find work, obey the laws and so on? 
Aside from following the law, there is nothing in Kant’s discussion that provides 
an answer to these questions; though one could assume that it would be at the 
discretion of the state concerned. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
the law of hospitality doesn’t forbid permanent residency for refugees or visitors, 
it merely states that permanent residency is not a right and it would be at the 
discretion of the states themselves to agree to this. 
 
In sum, Kant’s law of hospitality and concept of the original right to possession of 
the Earth are linked. This enables us to see how refugee right may arise from the 
right to external freedom. Original right to possession of the Earth’s surface, 
according to ‘nature or chance’, provides grounds for what Flikschuh termed a 
‘blameless acquisition’. This notion of a blameless acquisition correlates directly 
with the plight of the refugee. The refugee is compelled to flee their state, through 
threat of destruction or harm, and takes shelter in another state. When they flee 
then they have no place on earth and are therefore not able to express their right 
to innate freedom. Kleingeld summarised this succinctly with the following quote, 
‘humans have a right to freedom, freedom requires existence, and human 
existence requires a place on the globe; therefore, one has a right to be where 
one cannot help being and not to be sent away if this would lead to one’s demise 
(Kleingeld, 2012, pp 254).’  
 
3. Refugee Right and the Principle of Right  
So far, a Kantian refugee right has been shown to have a basis in the law of 
hospitality and flows from the universal and reciprocal right of humans to a place 
on the Earth. The law of hospitality includes a principle of non-refoulement, a right 
that protects an individual from being forced to leave a country should it result in 
the individual’s death (flowing from the right of humans to a place on Earth). That 
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being said, there are potential issues with how the principle of non-refoulement30 
would mesh with Kant’s right to private property.  
 
Kant’s universal principle of right is as follows:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (6:230).  
On the surface, this would appear to trigger a tension between right to property 
and refugee right when one remembers that the right to intelligible possession 
entails the following:  
A person can say they possess (or have) a field even though its location is distant 
from where they are insofar as they have it under their will and control to use as 
they see fit so long as it’s not in a way that conflicts with the law of outer freedom. 
Thus, others cannot come along and impose their own will on the field (6:252).  
Prima facie, one could argue that a refugee right would be inconsistent with this 
universal principle of right. For instance, the shipwrecked individual who has a 
right to the land on which he was thrust by chance would conflict with the 
individual’s right who rightfully owns the land. With this objection in mind, it ought 
to be recalled that to own an object is to be wronged if someone were to disturb 
the use of that object (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 256). Thus, as the shipwrecked crew 
are granted the use of the land on which they have landed, it appears to be an 
infringement upon the landowner.  
Nevertheless, Kleingeld considers that an answer to this conundrum can be 
found in the similarity between the state and the ‘universal state of humans’ 
(cosmopolitan right) (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 258). In Perpetual Peace, Kant 
describes the relation between individuals and states as:  
One based on cosmopolitan right, to the extent that individuals and states, who 
are related externally by the mutual exertion of influence on each other, are to be 
regarded as citizens of a universal state of humankind (ius cosmopoliticum). This 
classification is not arbitrary but necessary with respect to the idea of perpetual 
peace. (8:349).  
 
 
30 the order that no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her will, in any 
manner whatsoever, to a territory where they fear threat to life or freedom 
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Again, in the Doctrine of Right, Kant makes use of the term ‘the right of citizens 
of the world’ as owners of cosmopolitan rights31 to further support the existence 
of this universal society of humans (6:353). Kleingeld writes that, as the 
cosmopolitan right regulates interactions between states and ‘foreign individuals’, 
they are addressed as world citizens (in the universal state of humans) as 
opposed to citizens of a particular state (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 258). This is 
analogous to Kant’s ideal of the Kingdom of Ends, ‘a systematic union of different 
rational beings through common laws (4:433).’ A subsequent formulation of the 
categorical imperative requires that humans ‘act in accordance with the maxims 
of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends’ (4:439). 
Korsgaard emphasises that the Kingdom of Ends is an ideal notion:  
‘[The Kingdom of Ends is a] Republic of all rational beings…in which freedom is 
perfectly realised, for its citizens are free both in the sense that they have made 
their own laws and in the sense that the laws they have made are the laws of 
freedom – the juridical laws of external freedom and the ethical laws of internal 
freedom’ (Korsgaard, 2004, pp 23). 
 
The juridical laws of external freedom considered in the context of cosmopolitan 
right exist independently of a connection to a state.  That is all humans have an 
equal right to external freedom (not being subject to the choice of another) under 
cosmopolitan right. This notion is further supported by Kant’s famous quote in 
Perpetual Peace that ‘the community of the nations of the earth has now gone so 
far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all (8:360)’. A refugee 
(or foreign traveller) would not be subsumed under a form of a united will in the 
context of a juridical state (as they possess no citizenship rights in a foreign 
state), but  their treatment must be consistent with their right to humanity in their 
own person (as a citizen of the universal society of humans), and this contains 
within it the right to be wherever chance has placed them, their right to possession 
of a place on the earth’s surface (the innate right to freedom) (Ripstein, 2010, pp 
298):  
Only if you have nowhere else to go does the state’s right to restrict your entry 
make you subject to the choice of another. So the officials have to let you stay, 
simply in your capacity as a citizen of the world (Ripstein, 2010, pp 298). 
 
31 Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality. 
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Therefore, Kant’s cosmopolitan law provides a justification for an obligation states 
have to temporarily allow their land to be used to preserve the life of fellow world-
citizens (in the universal state of human beings). Byrd and Hruschka tie this right 
to the right to non-damaging use of property that was a part of the natural law 
theory of Grotius and Pufendorf (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 206). According 
to Pufendorf, non-damaging use of property, such as drinking water from a river 
that flows over a property owner’s land, is a right that remains from the ‘primaeval 
community’ long after ownership rights were established (Byrd and Hruschka, 
2011, pp 206). The notion of “non-damaging use” also echoes Kant’s requirement 
that a visitor to a foreign country behave ‘peaceably, this implies acting in a 
manner that does not cause harm to the citizens of the host country or wrongfully 
undermine their rights. While Achenwall rejected ‘non-damaging’ use of 
property32, Byrd and Hruschka believe that Kant returned to Grotius and 
Pufendorf’s arguments. Kant’s assertion that humans are all part of a ‘universal 
state of human beings’ taken together with the law of hospitality and the right to 
visit seem to be proof that Kant had turned away from Achenwall’s rejection of 
non-damaging use of property, returning to the work off Grotius and Pufendorf.  
 
 
4. A Modest Concept of Refugee Right 
So far, this chapter has aimed to create a Kantian foundation upon which a 
discussion on refugee right can begin to take shape. We have presented the idea 
that there is an implicit right to a ‘place to be’ in Kant’s philosophical framework, 
and that this also applies to refugees. However, it must be admitted that the 
account presented so far is modest in scope, particularly in light of the more 
modern, wide scope of refugee right articulated by the United Nations. The 
account of Kantian ‘refugee right’ given here is simply that those who are unable 
to return to their home state have a right to shelter until they are able to return 
(although permanent residency is not ruled out). If a Kantian refugee right can 
only offer a ‘place to be’, it falls short in terms of state obligations proposed under 
 
32 Achenwall believes that even non-damaging use of land, even drinking water from a stream 
or cutting through foreign territory, is impermissible without the consent of the people that own 
the land (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 206).  
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the current United Nations specifications on refugee rights. Under the UN’s 
account, a state is obligated to give refugees identity papers, education, 
healthcare, and food rations. On the Kantian level, there are no definite 
obligations apart from shelter until the refugee is able to return, unless the state 
wishes to bestow a right to reside.  
 
The Kantian account does not offer a permanent settlement as a right 
incorporated in refugee right per se. Kant explicitly stated that the law of 
hospitality protects the right of temporary sojourn only and not of a permanent 
habitation: 
It is not the right of a guest (Gastrecht) that the stranger has a claim to (which 
would require a special, charitable contract stipulating that he be made a member 
of the household for a certain period of time), but rather a right to visit, to which 
all human beings have a claim, to present oneself to society by virtue of the right 
of common possession of the surface of the earth (8:358). 
 
It is clear that in Kant’s law of hospitality there is no ‘right to citizenship or 
settlement (Doyle, 2012, pp 26)’. A contract of beneficence (Wohltätiger Vertrag) 
would be necessary in order for a foreigner to become a fellow citizen and this 
would be agreed between the individual and the sovereign. Citizenship of another 
state is not a right, but instead requires that which goes beyond ‘what is owed to 
the other morally and what he is entitled to legally (Benhabib, 2004, pp 27-28)’. It 
is not within the scope of hospitality to guarantee a universal right to permanently 
reside anywhere on Earth, but to lay down a groundwork for mutual, rightful 
interaction from which contracts such as permanent residency may be 
deliberated by public reason (Cavallar, 2015, pp 63).  
 
That being said, while permanent residency and citizenship are not matters of 
right, there could be room for rights of healthcare and nourishment, as well as 
non-discrimination as part of Kantian refugee right per se. The content of such a 
refugee right will be further examined in the following subsections, considering in 
turn justifications for possible forms of entitlements to social welfare and non-
discrimination in immigration access for refugees.  
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4.1 Healthcare and Education  
During Kant’s time, there was no ‘right to healthcare’ per se and so Kant did not 
explicitly attribute such a right, even to citizens. Therefore, rather than projecting 
modern notions backward by arguing for a Kantian right to healthcare per se, this 
section will apply fundamental Kantian principles to a modern-day society in 
which these institutions already exist in order to determine what access a refugee 
may have to existing welfare systems.  
 
While Kant makes no explicit statement that hospitality affords the traveller a right 
to access healthcare and food, there is reason to believe that hospitality implicitly 
includes these rights. Arguably, there would be an obligation on behalf of the 
state to permit access to necessary healthcare for the same reason they are 
obligated to give shelter. A state cannot send a refugee away if it would result in 
their death. Sending an individual away, should it lead to their death, would be a 
violation of their original right to a place on Earth. While in Kant’s time, this right 
to hospitality may have simply included a bed to sleep in and a hot meal, in 
modern times, it raises questions of what institutions of state refugees have a 
right to use. It could be argued that the overarching goal of hospitality, to maintain 
the life of a traveller, entails (when applied today) the right to basic care in the 
healthcare system.33 The implicit nature of the claim comes from the fact that the 
right to access a state’s healthcare is deduced from the same right of hospitality 
- the obligation on behalf of the state to maintain a visitor’s existence and not 
violate their innate right to external freedom.  
 
The suggestion that immigrants or refugees have a right to use a state’s health 
system remains a controversial claim. If a state has a public health system, then 
this system is funded by citizens as taxpayers. Thus, while it is free at the point 
of use (in the case of health systems such as the NHS), citizens contribute to 
their own healthcare via taxes. A new arrival to a country, however, has not paid 
into this system.34 While Kant did not discuss the use of a health system by 
 
33 For emergencies and important procedures, naturally. Anything that would be considered 
medically non-urgent or elective would be beyond the scope of hospitality.  
34 Health tourism is the term that is commonly used to describe the use of the NHS by foreign 
visitors and was a driving force behind many when voting for Brexit.  
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immigrants, he did advocate for institutions to support the poor and abandoned 
members of a state. Examining his deliberations on this will help us formulate a 
possible parallel argument for refugee entitlements. Kant was clear that a state 
does not only possess negative duties of right enforcement (i.e., preventing crime 
and punishing those who violate right), but also a positive duty of right to facilitate 
the growth of citizens on a civic level (foster autonomy and independence). An 
example of these positive duties is the right of the state ‘to impose taxes on the 
people for its own preservation… [and] the sustenance of those who are unable 
to provide for even their most necessary natural needs (6:326).’ Kant therefore 
believed there should be some redistribution towards the poorer members of 
society. This redistribution however was not done with the aim of making those 
citizens happy, but rather with the intention of furthering their capacities for 
expression of their fundamental external freedom and autonomy (Wood, 2008, 
pp 194). Kant’s position, then, is that a state ought to introduce institutions that 
foster and protect both the lives and autonomy of its own citizens:  
To the supreme commander there belong indirectly, that is, insofar as he has 
taken over the duty of the people, the right to impose taxes on the people for its 
own preservation, such as taxes to support organisations providing for the poor, 
foundling homes, and church organisations, usually called charitable or pious 
institutions.  
The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain 
itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority 
of the state in order to maintain those members of the society who are unable 
(die es selbst nicht vermögen) to maintain themselves. For reasons of state the 
government is therefore authorised to constrain the wealthy to provide the means 
of sustenance to those unable to provide for even their most necessary natural 
needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth, since they 
owe their existence to an act of submitting to its protection and care, which they 
need in order to live; on this obligation the state now bases its right to contribute 
what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens (6:326).  
We can see from the above extended quotation that Kant was adamant that 
states are obligated to provide for their citizens in need of help to sustain 
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themselves.35 This is not a matter of virtue or an imperfect duty of benevolence.  
Rather, the obligation is firmly based in the domain of Recht. If someone is 
dependent upon the wills of others, then they are not autonomous (Ripstein, 
2010, pp 15). The need for a state to support the poor rather than provide charity 
is that, in the civil condition, an individual being dependent upon another would 
be inconsistent with a shared, united will (Ripstein, 2010, pp 48).36 The united will 
is intended to exist in order to create laws by which citizens are able to govern 
themselves.  They could not as free rational beings agree to a scenario in which 
an individual is permanently dependent on the choice of another. 
 
Kant is not advocating paternalism which leads to permanent dependency. The 
provision of welfare is intended to be a temporary and strategic intervention in a 
broadly liberal project. Welfare is not grounded in maintaining or increasing 
citizens’ happiness or peddling an unrealistic standard of equality (Wood, 2008, 
194). State intervention is not paternalistic because it isn’t enacted in order to 
make citizens happy directly. Rather, intervention is intended to foster and protect 
citizens’ autonomy and existence (Wood, 2008, pp 194-195). Of course, it would 
be disingenuous to assert that welfare could not, on a base level at least, lead to 
a recipient’s happiness increasing, but this is merely a side effect of the main 
end, which is to allow or free up their ability to act as autonomous beings.37 
 
An obvious critical response at this point is that while Kant’s justification of 
economic and social support based on freedom and the principle of right may be 
persuasive, it is intended to apply only for those citizens of a juridical state. After 
all, as Ripstein points out: it is the shared, united will that makes such institutions 
possible (a united will that foreigners are not part of). Additionally, there is also 
the economic argument – the idea that the NHS, for example, isn’t ‘free’ because 
it is paid for by taxes and it should be used by the taxpaying British public.   
 
35 The notion that the preservation of society is the aim here is certainly interesting. This raises 
questions that could have implications on immigration laws, forbidding the inclusion of foreign 
elements into a society that might damage the society as a whole.  
36 The difference between the support of the state and charity is that, essentially, state support 
is grounded in right whereas charity is an imperfect duty.  
37 One could argue that providing a right to work and allowing/ actively helping refugees find 
employment is also critical in advancing the autonomy of those receiving government 
assistance and English language classes. Though this will be explored in more detail later in 
this section.  
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The above make important points, but the main question that needs to be 
answered is whether or not it would be outside the realm of hospitality to allow 
non-citizens use of these services (at least temporarily). A right to hospitality 
would be vacuous if only sanctuary were provided, without food, healthcare, or 
education. For instance, using Kant’s own example of the stranded seafarer, if a 
ship crashes onto a beach and the only survivor has a badly broken leg and 
infected wound, it would be insulting to only offer them a place on a beach to lie 
down and catch their breath. There is also a passage in the Doctrine of Right that 
could lend support to the notion that states should offer help to those who haven’t 
yet contributed to the state:  
As for maintaining those children abandoned because of poverty or shame, or 
indeed murdered because of this, the state has a right to charge the people with 
the duty of not knowingly letting them die, even though they are an unwelcome 
addition to the population (6:326). 
The important line here is ‘unwelcome addition to the population’. In her 
translation, Mary Gregor specifies that when Kant refers to ‘the population’, this 
can also relate to ‘the wealth or resources of a state (staatsvermögen)’, meaning 
that those abandoned children appear to be mere economic burdens upon the 
nation. With these notions of supporting certain members of the population 
regardless of economic burden in mind, Kleingeld suggests that the aim of the 
republic is to establish a condition of right (see first chapter) and that ‘costs 
(financial or otherwise) only become a relevant concern once they become so 
high that the republic cannot function well (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 243)’.38 We can 
gather from this that a state is supposed to maintain human life regardless of the 
cost upon the state. Naturally, one could argue that Kant was discussing the 
support of ‘unwanted’ future citizens (orphans or homeless children) who have 
the potential to become active citizens of the state in the future. While becoming 
an active citizen includes paying tax and, in a sense, paying back the ‘debt’ to 
society, Kant is clear that the ‘only qualification for being a citizen is being fit to 
vote’ (6:314).39 Regardless of whether or not they’re wanted or unwanted citizens, 
 
38 Naturally, it will be a contentious matter as to when this point is reached.  
39 Kant goes into great detail in describing that only those who are ‘independent’ ought to be fit 
to vote. Here, Kant makes a distinction between active and passive citizen that largely depends 
upon whether or not that individual is ‘under the discretion of protection of other individuals’. It 
also ought to be noted that, on Kant’s view, women were passive citizens solely because of 
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Kant still sees them as being inherently part of ‘the people’ and that public right 
extends to all who are part of the people. While it is certainly true to say that 
unwanted citizens of the state still remain citizens of the state, this notion that a 
state must maintain human life regardless of the cost upon the state ought not to 
be seen as exclusive to citizens, as the law of hospitality has shown - the law of 
hospitality forbids a state from participating in, either indirectly or directly, the 
death of a foreigner if that foreigner behaves peaceably. Additionally, it is also 
worth the mentioning here that many refugees will seek and gain permanent 
residency and will be grateful to work, pay taxes and contribute to the 
maintenance of the state.  As a result, they are potential or future citizens of the 
state. 
 
With regard to specific use of state institutions, it is also important to acknowledge 
that Kant unambiguously criticises the English for not opening their institutions 
for foreigners in his Anthropology From a Pragmatic View:  
For his compatriots the Englishman establishes great benevolent institutions, 
unheard of among other peoples. – But if a foreigner for whom fate has driven 
ashore on his soil falls into dire need, he can die on a dung hill because he is not 
an Englishman. - That is, not a man (7:314-315). 
The above mention of ‘benevolent institutions’ and a foreigner ‘driven ashore’ by 
fate certainly connect hospitality to a state’s resources such as healthcare. What 
Kant was suggesting in the above passage, then, is that the English were not 
recognising foreigners as human beings, more specifically, were not recognising 
the cosmopolitan right of endangered foreigners or their inherent value as 
humans and ends in themselves – ‘because he is not an Englishman… that is, 
not a man.’ Kleingeld read this the above passage as a critique, by Kant, on the 
English for not accepting refugees (Kleingeld, 2012, pp 339). While this could be 
seen as overstatement, it is clear that Kant disapproves of English institutions 
being forbidden from those non-English citizens who fall upon the British shore 
and desperately require help. If Kant’s statement on the English is viewed through 
the lens of the cosmopolitan right, we can garner a similar reading.  
 
 
their sex; so, when Kant said that ‘anyone can work his way up from the passive condition to an 
active one’, the ‘his’ certainly stands out.    
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To summarise, the account of refugee right that has been constructed in this 
chapter is tightly wound to the protection of life that comes from the original right 
to a place on Earth, via the innate right to freedom.40 The law of hospitality is 
drawn from the innate right to freedom based in our humanity, that is a person 
must have a place on Earth upon which they can express their rights in pursuit of 
autonomous ends-setting and cooperative constructive relations and activities 
with fellows. Not only is a place on Earth necessary for freedom, but so also is 
food and healthcare (one’s place on Earth will be very brief indeed without the 
support of food and healthcare). It is noteworthy that Kant has criticised the 
English for constructing grand institutions for their citizens but refusing foreigners 
at risk the right to use them. The law of hospitality then, coupled with Kant’s 
criticism of the English for refusing to extend institutional care to foreigners, 
shows that there is a Kantian argument for providing the basic needs of survival, 
such as healthcare and nourishment, to refugees.  
 
As with healthcare, Kant did not discuss foreigners having access to another 
state’s education systems. However, a similar argument to the above could be 
made that refugees ought to have access to education, whether it be English 
(local) language classes, work and skills based training, or standard education 
for children. Allowing refugees access to education is not only important as it 
helps to foster the autonomy and independence41 of individuals, but also for the 
cosmopolitan aim of humanity:  
Man is the only creature that must be educated, because there is in him immense 
possibility which is not yet developed, and a grand destiny, which is not yet 
attained (9:441).  
 
It will not be the focus of this section to argue that Kant believed in free education 
as a right, rather, I will argue that there is support for refugees being able to 
access their host state’s education systems as part of the cosmopolitan right. The 
first suggestion of this in Kant is that, when discussing education, Kant makes 
 
40 There could be some grey areas here, for instance, if a refugee will be staying in a state 
indefinitely it would severely impact their future if they were given no education.  
41 ‘The property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the 
objects of volition)’ (4:440).  
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frequent references to the ‘human race’ and its end goal, rather than a specific 
people or state:  
Our only hope is that each generation, provided with the knowledge of the 
foregoing one, is able, more and more, to bring about an education which shall 
develop man’s natural gifts in their due proportion and relation to their end, and 
thus advance the whole human race toward its destiny (9:441-442). 
 
This idea is, again, repeated by Kant with his suggestion ‘that children ought to 
be educated not for the present, but for a possible improved condition of man in 
the future’ (Röseler, 1948, pp 281). Consequently, allowing access to existing 
education institutions would allow refugees to learn, in order to build their own life 
in a foreign country.  
 
Nevertheless, questions may arise concerning the fairness to citizens of granting 
refugees access to the host country’s education provisions. As with health 
services, refugees have not paid into the system with taxes, and (in some 
situations) would be, to use Kant’s terminology, an ‘unwelcome addition to the 
population’. This raises the question, then, why should state’s allow refugees to 
use education systems, aside from the more abstract notions of moral 
improvement?  
 
Educating refugees would be in the interest of states. Not only will offering 
children and refugees education help to foster their autonomy, but it will also 
make them less reliant on state support to facilitate their autonomy. It would 
benefit the state in the long run by allowing more people to enter the workforce, 
support the economy (in turn paying taxes that will support themselves and the 
citizens of that country), and undertake and act out civic duties. Additionally, 
allowing for refugee children to enter state education will improve the chances 
that these children will integrate into the host state’s society. Kant himself had 
issues with parents teaching their children so as to encourage conformity rather 
than critical thinking42, but these issues are far more relevant to the refugee 
 
42 “Parents usually educate their children merely in a manner that, however bad the world may 
be, they may adapt themselves to its present condition. But, they ought to give them an 
education so much better than this, that a better condition of things may be thereby brought 
about in the future (9:448)” 
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scenario. If states do not offer to adequately educate newly arrived refugees, this 
will increase the likelihood of division between social groups, as foreign children 
would remain under parental cultural influence.  Social division would (at least 
temporarily) increase the burden on the government and taxpayer in the future. 
However, it is worth highlighting that what sounds good in theory is difficult to 
implement in practice. A recent survey in Australia has shown that, despite being 
given 500 hours of free English lessons, a large number of humanitarian refugees 
still have little to no English proficiency.43 This is clearly an issue that ought to be 
addressed by governments moving forward and it is important to highlight, just 
because something hasn’t worked in practice doesn’t mean that it doesn’t work 
in theory. Kant was also known for utilising this response, having wrote that just 
because a theory is a struggle to apply in practice does not mean we should not 
‘put trust in the theory of what the relationship between men and state ought to 
be according to the principle of right (8:276).’ 
 
4.2 Non-Discrimination 
Another important aspect of the UN’s delineation of refugee right is the idea of 
non-discrimination. This right forbids states from treating refugees differently 
because of their race, religion, sex, sexuality, and so on. Much like healthcare, 
this is an important feature to have in any refugee right. A refugee right that 
allowed arbitrary exclusion based on morally irrelevant factors would be flawed. 
This is the worry of Seyla Benhabib, who argued that the Kantian notion of 
common possession of the earth does little to elucidate the cosmopolitan right, 
leaving a vague account of refugee protections. Benhabib maintains that the duty 
to accept refugees is an imperfect duty, as it is conditional, but these conditions 
are vague (Benhabib, 2004, pp 31). If a refugee right is conditional, and these 
conditions are vague, then this could mean states can refuse to accept refugees 
for a variety of different factors, some of which may not be justified. For instance, 
could a state turn away refugees if they are altering cultural norms of the host 
 
43 SBS News. 2020. 'We Must Do Better': Government Plans Overhaul Of English Language 
Courses For Refugees. [online] Available at: <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/we-must-do-better-
government-plans-overhaul-of-english-language-courses-for-refugees> [Accessed 7 May 2020]. 
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states?44 Or if admitting large numbers would damage the quality of life of 
citizens?  
 
While it is true that there is little guidance on grounds for exclusion of immigrants 
for the good of the state, it was earlier shown that Kant’s law of hospitality does 
not justify arbitrary exclusions (i.e., racial or xenophobic). There is a difference 
between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for   forbidding entry into a state. It 
would be illegitimate to exclude travellers based on merely arbitrary 
characteristics. For instance, discriminatory laws that forbid entry to foreigners 
based on their skin colour would infringe upon their rights to establish contact and 
present themselves (Kleingeld, 1998, pp 77). If people are to be rejected a priori, 
regardless of the content of their character or what they have to offer, the 
cosmopolitan law is infringed (Kleingeld, 1998, pp 77). For example, a policy that 
forbids entry based on skin colour would be illegitimate, whereas a policy that 
forbids entry to people trading illegal drugs would not. For instance, when Kant 
supported the exclusions of certain Europeans from China and Japan, he was 
not supporting it arbitrarily or supporting it solely because China and Japan had 
a right to control their border. Rather, Kant supported it because of the actions of 
certain European countries. While it could be difficult to draw the line between 
legitimate and illegitimate in practical terms, the theoretical lines do show that 
Kant did not believe that any breed of rejection will be sufficient (Kleingeld, 1998, 
pp 77).   
 
While there are limitations with a Kantian account of refugee right, as Kant’s 
refugee right does not in itself match the UN’s account in terms of education or a 
right to permanent habitation, the Kantian account still fundamentally meets the 
principles of non-refoulment and respects the right of the refugee to a place on 
Earth. Additionally, there is also a cause to believe that the basic needs of 
refugees will be met while they are recipients of hospitality. These basic needs 
not only include existential needs such as healthcare and nourishment, but also 
needs that foster autonomy, such as education. 
 
44 This ‘altering’ could range from an influence on local eating habits to demanding public 
swimming pools be gender segregated, although this applies to immigration as a whole and not 
just refugees.  
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5. Derrida’s Objection 
So far, I have attempted to construct a concept of refugee right that I argue is 
inferable from Kant’s law of hospitality and concomitant to humanity’s innate right 
to freedom.  This concept of refugee right is thus implicit, rather than explicit, in 
Kant’s moral-political philosophy.  The innate right to freedom, incurring a right to 
be some place on Earth, on the basis original possession of the Earth’s surface, 
combined with the law of hospitality, could be viewed as aligning with UN 
conventions on refugees, vis-à-vis the right to seek asylum and the principle of 
non-refoulment.  I have furthermore suggested Kant’s principle in public right 
according to which the state is obligated to support those vulnerable in the 
community who are unable to meet basic needs, could be extended under the 
umbrella of cosmopolitan right to refugees and asylum-seekers. Kant 
emphasises that he is not advocating paternalism; rather the aim is to provide 
conditions within which individual autonomy may be expanded. That being said, 
despite the fact that the refugee right presented so far has been shown to give 
refugees and asylum seekers a right to reside, use healthcare, receive food, and 
education in order to nurture their autonomy as well as protect their life; this 
account of refugee right is also modest in comparison to the modern UN account, 
as it does not offer a right to residency. Kant was clear that the ‘stranger cannot 
claim the right of a guest to be permanent, for this would require a special friendly 
agreement whereby he might become a member of the native household’ (8:358).  
 
This division between a right to visit and a right to reside has led to criticism 
among several critics. With Jacques Derrida being the most prominent scholar to 
criticise Kant for the cosmopolitan right’s failure to provide a right to permanent 
residency for asylum seekers I will address his criticism here  
 
Derrida, who is firmly rooted in the continental tradition, used asylum seekers and 
refugees to illustrate the limits of Kant’s law of hospitality.45 Derrida’s first critique 
states that as Kant’s universal law of hospitality does not include the right to 
permanent residency, it undermines the ‘universality of the concept (Brown, 
2010, pp 310)’. In other words: 
 
45 Due to Derrida’s continental tradition, I will be indebted to Brown in gaining a clear 
understanding of Derrida.  
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… [Derrida] locates a double or contradictory imperative that [lies within] the 
concept of cosmopolitanism: on the one hand, there is an unconditional 
hospitality which should offer the rights of refuge to all immigrants and 
newcomers. But on the other hand, hospitality has to be conditional: there has to 
be some limit on the right to residence (Brown, 2010, pp 310). 
Derrida begins his critique of Kant’s hospitality by claiming that, at first, Kant 
seems to ‘extend the cosmopolitan law to encompass universal hospitality 
without limit. Such is the condition of perpetual peace between all men (Derrida, 
2010, pp 311).’ However, Derrida then highlights an issue with the universality of 
this cosmopolitism as Kant ‘excluded hospitality as a right of residence; [and as 
such] he limits it to the right of visitation.’ This leads Derrida to criticise Kant’s law 
of hospitality on two accounts. Firstly, that Kant’s requirement that right of 
residency be conditional upon a contract ‘that could only be the object of a 
particular treaty between states’ makes hospitality dependent upon treaties 
between states, which Derrida then suggests would lead to xenophobic and 
discriminatory restrictions on immigrants. The second criticism from Derrida is 
that this restrictive right of residency grants too much power to the state, allowing 
the state to police and control the realms of hospitality. Derrida then suggests 
that these two issues make Kant’s cosmopolitan right untenable.  
 
For Derrida, the fact that a state has control over the conditionality of hospitality 
leads to ‘distinctions’ between peoples and an ‘othering’ of one people to another 
and that this is ‘contrary to the spirit of cosmopolitan universality’ (Brown, 2010, 
pp 312). More specifically, Derrida is concerned that the lack of a right to 
permanent residence would give the state the right to turn away an asylum seeker 
or refugee (Critchley and Kearney, 2001, pp 25-26). According to Brown’s 
interpretation of Derrida’s argument, this would:  
violate the egalitarian conception of equal human worth as individual moral 
beings and repudiates the idea of a political realm without borders, ‘where 
nothing human is alien’ and where we should ‘measure the boundaries of our 
nation by the sun’ (Brown, 2010, pp 312). 
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In order to respond to this, our focus will turn towards a nuance in the distinction 
between hospitality and the right to reside. A response to Derrida’s objection is 
to re-highlight the two main features of the cosmopolitan right in Kant: 
1. A right to resort by communal possession of the earth’s surface.  
2. A right of the visited against the visitor for the visitor to behave peaceably.  
In his criticism of Kant’s cosmopolitan right, Derrida overlooks the second feature 
listed above, one of the founding principles of the cosmopolitan right – the 
protection of the visited state. While Derrida is correct in reading Kant’s hospitality 
through the lens of a state offering protection to a visitor from another state, 
Derrida also fails to read the wider context of Kant’s law of hospitality. The period 
in which Kant was writing is important as it was one of imperialism and 
colonisation, with the Spanish, British, and Ottoman Empires all expanding 
across the globe: 
The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly 
discovered and purportedly barbaric or irreligious lands, as goods belonging to 
no one, without the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, 
are absolutely contrary to cosmopolitan right (23:174). 
Consequently, and as was shown earlier, the cosmopolitan right was constructed 
with the purpose of protecting cultures from the paternalistic influence of 
colonialist nations. 
The clearest practical example of this limitation of the right to permanent visitation 
was Kant’s support for the policy of China and Japan to limit western travellers 
as visitors only, rather than permanent residents (Brown, 2010, pp 314). Their 
justification for their isolationist policy came from the inhospitable, or 
unpeaceable, behaviour of the ‘commercial states’ as Kant called them. A 
description of Kant’s objections to colonialist behaviour can be seen in the 
following: 
The inhospitable conduct of the civilised states of our containment, especially the 
commercial states, the injustices which they display in visiting foreign countries 
and peoples (which in their case is the same as conquering them) seems 
appallingly great (8:358-9). 
 
Thus, the accusation that Kant is perpetuating an isolationist nationalism in 
placing limiting conditions on foreigners in states would be misguided, as the 
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limited conditions are intended to defend those home states from outside, 
paternalistic interferences (Cavallar, 2002, pp 360). As Charles Covell notes, the 
cosmopolitan right requires that ‘the freedom of the individual is limited in such a 
way as to secure the freedom of all.’ (Covell, 1998, pp 49). The restrictions that 
Kant does agree with are born from reasoned justifications, rather than arbitrary 
prejudice. Additionally, the main purpose of Kantian hospitality is to provide a 
foundation for ‘mutual ethical exchange’ rather than the ‘full and thoroughgoing 
sense of cosmopolitan justice’ that Derrida was hoping for. Kant, after laying 
down the groundwork for mutual interaction between peoples, then leaves a 
space for public reason to deliberate further contracts, such as a permanent 
residence. It is because of this that Brown suggests that Derrida overstated or 
expected too much from Kantian hospitality (Brown, 2010, pp 316). 
 
Derrida’s second issue, that states would have a right to reject legitimate asylum 
seekers on a whim, is also unfounded. As this chapter has shown, Kant was clear 
in his law of hospitality that a state must not turn away a visitor if doing so would 
result in that visitor’s death (8:358). Naturally, one could respond to this that 
Kant’s law of hospitality is still restrictive towards asylum seekers, as not every 
asylum seeker is fleeing their home nation for existential threats of death; some 
flee due to religious persecution and threats of imprisonment or torture, to name 
but a few. If a Kantian refugee right would only allow those who flee from threats 
of death to receive sanctuary, then it would be a very restrictive form of refugee 
right indeed. That being said, Derrida’s concerns that the law of hospitality would 
not allow for a stringent protection for asylum seekers are not as evident as first 
might appear. In fact, Kant allows for a broad range of grounds for protection, 
other than threats of death, including property damage, bodily harm, or slavery. 
Pauline Kleingeld has argued that the limits of Kant’s hospitality should not be 
reduced to existential threats on an individual’s life, as the term Untergang 
(destruction) is broad enough to include mental or physical harm, such as torture 
or fear of torture (Kleingeld, 1998, pp 77). Additionally, acts of torture or threat of 
torture would count as what Kant called ‘inhospitable conduct’ (actions that could 
lead to bodily harm or damage of property). Kant gave as examples of 
inhospitable conduct ‘enslaving seafarers’, ‘plundering of property’, or ‘slavery to 
repay debts’. This broader interpretation of the concept of facing ‘destruction’ as 
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grounds for protection of a fleeing asylum seeker pushes Kantian hospitality 
closer to the United Nations refugee convention, which also prohibits refoulment 
if mental or physical harm will come to the individual. 
 
Derrida’s concern that the law of hospitality fails to allow for right to permanent 
residency has been shown to be overstated. As has been shown in this chapter, 
there is no universal right to permanent residency. If there was, this would leave 
Kant open to justifications of colonialism. While the law of hospitality explicitly 
forbids expulsion if doing so would lead to the individual’s death, Kant’s use of 
the term untergang allows for a broad range of inhospitable conduct. As such, 
this section showed that Derrida was expecting too much from Kant’s hospitality 
in criticising it for its lack of a right to permanent residency, while the scholar also 
misunderstood Kant’s use of the term untergang in his later criticism.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter opened by exploring the cosmopolitan right and law of hospitality in 
Kant’s published work. The aim of this chapter was to show how the original right 
to a place on Earth is connected to the law of hospitality, which in turn grants 
visitors grounds for protection in foreign countries. This law of hospitality 
guarantees a principle of non-refoulement, forbidding a state from sending away 
a visitor if doing so would result in their death or ‘destruction’, a concept that can 
be more broadly understood. The position of this thesis, then, is that the law of 
hospitality acts as a foundation for refugee right and is connected to the original 
right to freedom via the original right to a place on Earth. Rather than finding a 
strict refugee right in Kant, the interpretation suggested in this chapter is that 
every human has a right to a place on Earth, and this also applies to refugees. 
This original right to a place on Earth is universal, reciprocal and connected to 
the innate right to external freedom, since any person could find themselves in 
the position of the refugee if circumstances changed. However, we saw that 
Kantian refugee right goes further than merely granting a right to a place to be. It 
was found that while the Kantian account is not as broad as the UN’s modern 
concept of refugee right, it still allows for access to healthcare, food, education, 
and protections against arbitrary discrimination. 
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I then went on to discuss anticipated objections to both Kant’s law of hospitality 
and the refugee right as presented in this chapter, grappling with Derrida’s 
objection that there was an internal contradiction in Kant’s concept of 
cosmopolitan right. Nevertheless, the need remains to look more closely at how 
a Kantian concept of refugee right could be implemented internationally. 
Regardless of the content of a right, it seems academic to have a right without 
any means of enforcing it. Or is Benhabib correct in concluding that only imperfect 
duties, not in principle enforceable externally, are entailed by the account of 
refugee right implicit in Kant?   Henceforth the focus of this thesis will shift towards 
























Chapter Three: The Question of Enforcement in an International Context 
 
The purpose of this thesis so far has been to articulate an implicit account of 
refugee right found within Kant’s broader philosophy. The 'refugee right’ in 
question is, essentially, the right to common possession of the Earth’s surface 
which is possessed universally by all by virtue of their humanity. The refugee 
aspect simply combines the law of hospitality more explicitly to the original right 
to a place on Earth, highlighting the importance of a place on Earth to practical 
expression of the innate right to external freedom. This Kantian account of 
refugee right guarantees those eligible a right to non-refoulement, healthcare, 
food, and education. That being said, there remain issues with regard to real 
world implementation of this right that ought to be considered. For instance, 
would a state have a right to coerce another state into accepting refugees? One 
recent notable real-world example has been the case of Hungary. The central 
European nation has been clear and explicit in asserting that they will not accept 
refugees against their will, even going so far as to construct a fence along certain 
borders. This begs the question of whether it would be permissible for other states 
(or the European Union) to coerce Hungary into accepting refugees. Answering 
this question in general terms requires an exploration of Kant’s notions of an 
international juridical state. In what follows I briefly reintroduce Kant’s treatment 
of coercion in the domestic civil state, in order to frame the discussion of coercion 
internationally. This will lead us into a discussion of Kant’s view of the state of 
nature between states that exists prior to any supranational civil juridical ‘state of 
states’ before examining the specific forms of international juridical state Kant 
considers. The focus of this chapter will be on the initial question of whether or 
not individual states can be coerced into the formation and structure of an 
international civil condition, leaving the further discussion on whether or not law, 
once an international civil condition is established, can be coercible 
internationally for the fourth and final chapter of the thesis. 
 
1. The Right of Coercion in the Juridical State  
The first chapter of this thesis focussed on the fundamentals of Kant’s Doctrine 
of Right. This included a discussion on freedom and how, via various acquired 
rights and postulates of reason, Kant established an obligation for individuals to 
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form a juridical state. In order to help understand the need for coercion on the 
international level, and to introduce a framing device, this section will recap the 
discussion of the first chapter in order to briefly explain the importance of 
distributive justice.  
 
The first chapter stated the universal principle of right as the following:  
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law (6:230).  
This principle limits the freedom of the individual so that it accords with the 
freedom of others. That being said, it would be false to suggest that hindering 
freedom is always wrong, as coercion plays an important role in Kant’s 
philosophy. If a free action is hindering the freedom of others in accordance with 
universal laws, then coercion used in opposition to this is consistent with freedom 
in accordance with universal laws (6:231). Therefore, according to the principle 
of contradiction, right contains a permission to coerce others if right is infringed. 
It is reciprocal coercion, as Kant calls it, that makes the ‘presentation of that 
concept [of right] possible (6:233)’. 
 
Despite the fact that coercion is permitted, and rights do exist, they will only exist 
provisionally without the presence of a juridical state with the power and authority 
to distribute justice. Consequently, we have the same rights compared to that 
which can be conceived in the state of nature, the only difference being that these 
rights have been made public and secured by the united will of the people and 
the state. Accordingly, individuals must progress into the civil condition via the 
postulate of public law:  
When you cannot avoid living side by side with others you ought to leave the 
state of nature and proceed with them into the rightful condition, that is, a 
condition of distributive justice46 (6:307). 
 
The state is a representation of the united will of the citizenry and, according to 
Kant, allows the people to ‘[govern] themselves through their own legislation, and 
 
46 Distributive justice here referring to the power the sovereign or government has to enforce 
right coercively among its citizens.  
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the state enacts and enforces this (Byrd, 1995, pp 176)’. In other words, the 
united will of the people is the state, and it is the united will of the people that 
generates the existence of sovereignty. For, a state is a collection of people and 
therefore it is the united will of the people that is sovereign. 
 
Distributive justice, then, allows a central legislative institution to complement and 
extend the constraints of natural law. Kant’s idea of public law in the juridical 
state, then, flows from his concept of private law in the state of nature. Private 
law is the idea that ‘everyone follows his own judgement.’ The juridical state, on 
the other hand, is a state of public law; particularly, a state in which those private 
rights in the state of nature have been codified and are now legally coercible.  
 
Kant’s juridical state requires three different public institutions (legislative, 
executive, judicial), each dealing with a different arm of the state. The legislative 
branch sets the laws and is made up of citizens, the executive, or sovereign is 
the government and enforces the united will of the people, and the judicial branch 
settles disputes of right with finality.  
 
The aforementioned three types of public institutions are attained through human-
made public institutions, meaning they serve and are available to, everyone 
(Williams, 1983, pp 171). The three institutions are necessary conditions for the 
creation of a juridical state; Kant states that public justice is the formal principle 
of the possibility of a juridical state. This means that for a juridical state to be 
made possible, public justice must exist in its three institutions. All of these 
institutions must exist or else the juridical state is not attainable. 
 
The conclusions of this thesis so far raise important questions about how we will 
approach coercibility in international law. The two that will be most important will 
be the following:  
- Is there a state of nature internationally that states are obligated to leave 
for an international civil condition of some kind, in the same way societies 
are obligated to leave the state of nature to enter a national civil condition? 
- If so, after leaving the international state of nature, what form will this 
international juridical state take?  
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With these two questions in mind, this chapter will now turn from the domestic 
state to the international situation in order to determine if there is any real-world 
application to the Kantian refugee right constructed across Chapters One and 
Two.  
 
2. State of Nature Between States 
If we are to find support in Kant for some level of international coercion among 
states comparable to justified coercion within the juridical state, we must first, 
again, begin with the state of nature. This condition has so far described a state 
of affairs in which there are no conclusive rights between individuals. In other 
words, there is no power according to which rights or fundamental freedoms can 
be enforced and protected. Which is why Kant argued that individuals must unite 
under a shared will and submit before distributive justice in order to bring about 
a civil condition. The pre-existing state of nature is thus viewed as the antithesis 
of the juridical state. But now the question has international implications: can we 
speak of a state of nature existing between nation states?    
 
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant envisages an analogous state of nature existing 
between states.47 Firstly, Kant asserted that ‘states, considered in external 
relation to one another, are (like lawless savages) by nature in a non-rightful 
condition (6:344).’ This non-rightful condition is analogous to the state of nature 
between individuals prior to entering the civil condition. The main difference 
between the two states of nature is simply one of scale. The condition among 
states, as opposed to simply being a ‘state of nature’, is also a ‘condition of war 
 
47 Philosopher Chiara Bottici has raised an interpretive issue with the type of argument provided 
here. Bottici asserts that ‘we should read [reference to the domestic and international states of 
nature in Kant] as rhetorical devices aimed at persuading rulers to apply those principles in their 
policymaking (Bottici, 2009, pp 64)’. According to Bottici, the purpose of the analogy between 
individuals and states is to ‘formulate the problem’ that exists in international politics (Bottici, 2009, 
pp 64)’. In other words, Kant uses the domestic state of nature as a rhetorical device to highlight 
the fact that states are also in a state of nature, without supposing this condition is analogous or 
identical to the state of nature at the domestic level. Bottici asserts that the two states of nature 
are disanalogous because states are not under a strict obligation to leave the state of nature, 
whereas individuals are so obligated (Bottici, 2009, pp 65). Associate Professor of International 
Relations at the University of Nottingham, Ben Holland, however, rejects Bottici’s argument as 
‘overdrawn’ (Holland, 2016, pp 608). He suggests that, while we must be careful of overextending 
Kant’s analogy, Kant does describe features that both ‘states of nature’ have in common and it is 
‘surely more than a rhetorical device’ (Holland, 2017, pp 608).  
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(of the right of the stronger) (6:344)’. That being said, it is in Kant’s discussion of 
the ‘condition of war’ that we see the first reference to the international state of 
nature by name:  
In the state of nature among states, the right to go to war (to engage in hostilities) 
is the way in which a state is permitted to prosecute its right against another state, 
namely by its own force, when it believes it has been wronged by the other state; 
for this cannot be done in the state of nature by a lawsuit (6:344). 
In the state of nature among states, the only way in which a state can secure a 
right against another state is by war, as these rights are not conclusively secured 
due to the fact that there is no independent adjudicator with the power to resolve 
disputes of right between two parties (Cavallar, 2002, pp 340). The state is, 
therefore, permitted to defend its rights if it has been wronged by another state. 
Going to war is the only way a state could do this, as lawsuits or courts do not 
exist in the state of nature. There are parallels here to how, in the state of nature 
between individuals, one is permitted to enforce their ownership rights through 
force:  
Hence the state of peace must be established. For refraining from hostilities does 
not guarantee a state of peace, and when one neighbour does not guarantee the 
peace of the other (which can occur only in a juridical condition), the other 
neighbour who called upon the first to do so can treat him as an enemy (8:317).  
Only by leaving the state of nature and submitting before coercive laws can 
distributive justice be enforced, and rights protected, in a way that protects 
ongoing peace and security (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 69).  
 
Hence, there is a state of nature that can exist between states which is a non-
rightful condition, and also a condition of war (6:344). This state of nature can be 
compared to the state of nature between persons, as both lack any conclusive 
rights and require the assertion of force in order to protect rights, rather submitting 
to coercive law. In addition to Kant’s references to the un-rightful condition among 
states as a state of nature, Kant also claims that states are obligated to leave this 
state of nature, as are individuals. That being said, while the domestic state of 
nature is in this fundamental respect analogous to the international state of 
nature, it doesn’t necessarily follow that both have the same manner of exit. The 
question now, then, becomes what form will an international civil condition take? 
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3. The Three Forms of International State 
The previous section explored Kant’s postulation of a real state of nature existing 
between states, showing that as individuals are compelled to leave the domestic 
state of nature, states are likewise compelled to leave the international state of 
nature. That discussion ended however, with the question of the form a juridical 
state between states would properly take. Therefore, this section will explore the 
three forms of international civil condition Kant discussed in On the Common 
Saying (1793), Perpetual Peace (1795), and the Doctrine of Right (1797).  
 
The three forms of international relations were first discussed together in The 
Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace. Kant’s goal with this work was to 
describe a structure through which states can reach a condition of peace, a world 
in which war has been rendered extinct (Habermas, 1997, pp 113). Kant, writing 
at a time of instability and frequent conflict, saw war as the harbinger of violence 
and devastation, as well as the cause of the plundering of lands, horrific debts 
and, regarding the victims of war, subjugation, loss of liberty and foreign 
dictatorship (Habermas, 1997, pp 114). War not only causes horrific wrongs but, 
due to its nature, war also leads to land theft, deceit, and murder. These harms 
are not just unintended side-effects. War explicitly relies on them in order to 
progress (win the war) (8:346). While it will not be probed in depth here, Kant also 
listed ways in which wars ought to be fought, if they must be fought.  These 
include the prohibition of warfare that includes spying, the making of a false peace 
that would lead to a later war, and assassination (8:346-7) (6:347).   
 
This need to contain how a war is fought is important, as Kant believes the ends 
of such a war defines the conditions of peace (Habermas, 1997, pp 116). Specific 
peace treaties may bring the end of specific wars, but Kant recognises a need for 
a peace among all peoples to put ‘an end to war forever’ and the evils it brings. 
The only way in which this can be done is to unite all states under a civil condition, 
and so Kant had to find a solution to the conceptual challenge of how this 
international order should be structured. Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, then, is 
not simply the absence of war. Rather, it is a condition brought about by contract 
and agreements between states that will render war and the moral decline 
associated with war, murder, theft, and devastation, impossible.  
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3.1 – Universal Monarchy 
The first possible form of international institution Kant discusses is that of a 
universal monarchy, first mentioned in On the Common Saying (8:311). This 
condition is described as a global state in which there is ‘one cosmopolitan 
constitution under a single head (8:311).’ This position is best described as a 
global state, for it possesses one sovereign and encompasses all people of the 
world as citizens (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 197-198). When considering the 
idea of a world state, one could be excused for thinking of this as John Lennon’s 
description of a ‘utopia’ in Imagine (1971) – a state in which ‘differences’ are put 
aside and we view Japan in the same way that we view Queensland.48 Kant, 
however, raised both conceptual and practical issues with such a model in 
Perpetual Peace:   
For the term state implies the relation of one who rules to those who obey – that 
is to say, of lawgiver to the subject of people: and many nations in one state 
would constitute only one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here 
we have to consider the right of one nation against another, insofar as they are 
so many states and are not to be fused into one. (PP 8:354). 
This passage highlights a self-contradiction in relation to international law within 
the concept of the world state, for international law is meant to be the law of 
nations in their relation to other nations. If all nation states were to dissolve into 
one nation state then there would be no law in relation to other nations as there 
are no other nations (8:311) (Byrd and Hruschka, 2008, pp 630).49 So, on a 
fundamental view, the very existence of a world state cancels out the need for 
international law. Consequently, if the universal monarchy would come into being, 
there would be no need for a refugee right. In fact, it would be questionable as to 
whether one could even frame the concept of a refugee in a condition of universal 
monarchy. There may be issues over sharing or resources that could lead to 
population shifts, but this wouldn’t correspond to the refugee phenomenon as we 
know it today.  
 
 
48 The areas of land that they currently govern, of course, for if a universal state was to be 
implemented there would be no states.  
49 On an even more worrying note, it would also end international sporting competitions such as 
the FIFA World Cup, the Ashes, and the Olympics.  
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The aforementioned problem is not the only reason Kant rejected the model of 
the world state. Kant also highlighted the impractical size of such a world state. 
Kant saw it as a ‘law of nature’ that just laws cannot be maintained by a single 
state extending over the whole Earth, as even just states lapse into anarchy and 
despotism when they reach critical mass (Guyer, 2000, pp 417):  
For with the increased domain of the regime the laws progressively lose their 
impact, and a soulless despotism, after rooting out the seeds of goodness, finally 
lapses into anarchy (8:367). 
Paul Guyer speculates that Kant had the fall of the Roman Empire in mind when 
envisaging the limitations of a world state (Guyer, 2000, pp 417). In addition to 
the foregoing conceptual issues, there are practical difficulties in implementing a 
form of universal monarchy.  If this ‘super-state’ were to literally encompass the 
world, it would not be able to account for the existing long-established differences 
and diversity between peoples. The idea here is that, while it is possible for states 
to dissolve into a universal state, it is not possible for all peoples of the world to 
dissolve into a single people. The peoples will inevitably wish to remain as distinct 
entities. An adoption of universal monarchy would thus end up steamrolling 
cultural diversity with a constitution in which “all freedom and with it (which it 
entails) all virtue, taste and scholarship must disappear” (Byrd and Hruschka, 
2011, pp 198). A universal monarchy form of government is not practically ideal 
for another reason. Not only would the ever-growing conglomeration of states 
likely involve suppression of cultural diversity and identities, but the attempted 
suppression may also give rise to cultural-ethnic tensions, such as prevailed in 
the former state of Yugoslavia. An internally conflicted universal monarchy would 
resort to more suppression, rather than reasonable resolution, of disputes (Byrd 
and Hruschka, 2011, pp 198). The world state, then, is rejected by Kant for both 
conceptual and practical reasons. 
When you are using ‘universal monarchy’ as a name it may be best to put in 
italics.  When used as description no need to.  Same for other models. 
 
 
3.2- Association of States 
The second model of international relations Kant considers is the association of 
states (sometimes referred to as the state of states). This model requires states 
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to join together in a ‘juridical state of a federation according to commonly agreed 
upon international law (8:311).’ This international law would be based upon 
‘public laws combined with coercive force’. Every state must subject itself to these 
laws ‘according to the analogy of a civil or state law for individuals (8:312).’ In 
Perpetual Peace, Kant would go on to say: 
In accordance with reason there is only one way that states in relation to each 
other can leave the lawless condition, which involves nothing but war; it is that, 
like individual human beings, they give up their savage (lawless) freedom, 
accommodate themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always 
growing) state of nation states (civitas gentium) that would finally encompass all 
the nations of the earth (8:357). 
Kant saw this form of relations as ideally instantiating the best position states 
could adopt in order to achieve perpetual peace. This can be seen from the fact 
Kant described it as the ‘only way in accordance with reason’ for states to leave 
the state of nature (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 199). This association of states 
is a model in which states submit themselves to coercive laws in order to protect 
their rights as a state. This would make it analogous to the juridical state on the 
domestic level, as it would be a condition of distributive justice in which coercive 
force is used to enforce right and protect freedoms.  
 
The introduction of this second model of international relation is sometimes 
conflated with the universal monarchy and so a more explicit separation is in 
order. The world state qua universal monarchy is a cosmopolitan constitution 
united under ‘one head’, meaning that there is one world government, forming a 
global state, that sets laws and legislation (van Hooft, 2009, pp 121-122). In the 
universal monarchy, all nations are combined into one cosmopolitan order. 
However, in the association of states each member state retains its own unique 
identity. In other words, the state of states qua association of states is a union 
that brings states together into a civil condition under some kind of international 
law without sacrificing the sovereignty of those states or bringing them under a 
single, one-world government. Unfortunately, Kant does not provide detail on how 
this international law would be arrived at or distributed. In the Doctrine of Right, 
Kant links the state of states (association of states) to the domestic concept of 
the civil union (Byrd and Hruschka, 2008, pp 633). It is this link to the concept of 
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a civil union that further illustrates that states ought to be under the protection of 
a juridical law.  So, the state of states (association of states) is a union that brings 
states together into a civil condition without bringing those states under a 
centralised international government with executive powers.  
 
The association of states model would allow states to bring their grievances to 
an arbiter who can then distribute justice and settle disputes of right with a finality 
that would avoid conflict (Cavallar, 2002, pp 345-346).50 That being said, Kant 
did not give a clear account of what this arbitration process would look like or how 
the coercive law in this form would be enforced (van Hooft, 2009, pp 146). On the 
domestic level, we have the police force who enforce the law and keep the peace, 
however Kant did not give any indication as to how international rights under an 
association of states would be enforced (Guyer, 2000, pp 412-13). van Hooft 
points out that an international police force would need to be under the command 
of some kind of supra-national institution, but the principles of international law 
cannot be founded on war or threat of violence, for this would equal ‘might is right’ 
(van Hooft, 2009, pp 146). Therefore, van Hooft proposes that the best that could 
be hoped for is a unilateral agreement among states for the use of arms to be 
voluntarily surrendered (van Hooft, 2009, pp 146). There is reason to believe that 
this is a position Kant would have agreed with, as there is discussion within 
Perpetual Peace for the abolition of all standing armies over time, not only 
because Kant saw armies as being a means rather than an end, but also 
because:  
… they incessantly menace other states by their readiness to appear at all times 
prepared for war; they incite them to compete with each other in the number of 
armed men, and there is no limit to this … the cost of peace finally becomes more 
oppressive than that of a short war, and consequently a standing army is itself a 
cause of offensive war … (8:345). 
From this we can gather that a standing army is opposed to the concept of 
perpetual peace as it would be seen as a threat. In such a state of states, it would 
be imagined that states would have already disbanded their armies and therefore 
an international police force would hinder perpetual peace.  
 
50 Questions could be asked over who would be chosen to be an arbiter in this situation, but this 
lies beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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3.3 – League of Nations 
Finally, the third model Kant discusses is the league of nations (sometimes 
referred to as the league of states). His conception of the league of nations, unlike 
the association of states, does not require states to submit themselves before 
coercive laws from a supranational source:  
Hence, instead of the positive idea of a world-republic, if all is not to be lost, only 
the negative substitute for it, a federation averting war, maintaining its ground 
and ever extending over the world may stop the current of this tendency to war 
and shrinking from the control of law (8:357). 
 
This league, then, has no sovereign authority in itself. It exists as a mere grouping 
of states that can be renounced by a member state at any time and must therefore 
be renewed from time to time (6:344). The league simply exists in order to secure 
freedom for itself and its allies and because of this is a mere surrogate for 
perpetual peace (Bohman, 1997, pp 180). That is to say, the state will not itself 
achieve perpetual peace, as there are no laws between nations, however the 
existence of such a league would at least create a system in which a peace may 
exist. The purpose of the league of nations, which Kant describes as necessary, 
is ‘not in order to meddle in one another’s internal dissensions but to protect from 
attacks from without (6:344)’. The notion of ‘protecting from attacks from without’ 
could lead one to compare the league of nations with modern defensive alliances 
such as NATO, the former Warsaw Pact, or ANZUS. While the defensive alliance 
aspect of the league of nations is important, it would be overdrawn to suggest 
that the league of nations is purely a defensive alliance akin to NATO. The league 
of nations  was conceived by Kant to be a surrogate for peace and bring states 
closer together; whereas modern defensive alliances, such as NATO, require 
member states to commit to defence spending in their budgets, a policy that 
arguably breaks Kant’s preliminary articles for Perpetual Peace.51 Kant’s concept 
 
51 Specifically, the third article, ‘Standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall gradually be abolished 
entirely.’ Kant goes on to say here, ‘For they continually threaten other states with war by their 
willingness to appear equipped for it at all times. They prompt other states to outclass each other 
in the number of those armed for battle, a number that knows no limits. And since the costs 
associated with maintaining peace will in this way become more oppressive than a brief war, 
these armies themselves become the cause of offensive wars, carried out in order to diminish 




of the league of nations is better than having nothing at all and ought to be formed 
in order create a negative substitute for a juridical state that could stave war in 
the short term and, hopefully, prepare nations for the creation of a civil 
constitution such as the state of nation states (Bohman, 1997, pp 180).  
 
4. The Association of States or the League of Nations?  
The foregoing discussion showed that Kant had three different possibilities in 
mind when describing how states can leave the international state of nature. 
While the first possibility, the universal monarchy, (where the concept of refugees 
would in effect disappear), was dismissed by Kant, the remaining two were not 
rejected outright. This section will aim to swiftly tie up which supranational 
structure Kant preferred, before moving discussion on in Chapter Four to 
consider the extent to which right, in relation to refugees in particular, might be 
enforceable within this structure.   
  
While Kant did indeed describe the association of states as being the ‘only way 
in accordance with reason’ that states can leave the state of nature, there are a 
few potential worries that pushed Kant towards choosing the league of nations 
as the most realistic method of international relations. One passage in which Kant 
appears to show his favour for the creation of a league over the creation of an 
association is as follows:  
As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no 
other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains only 
war, than for them to relinquish …their wild (lawless) freedom, and to accustom 
themselves to public, binding laws, … form a (continually expanding) state of 
peoples (civitas gentium), which would ultimately comprise all of the peoples on 
earth. But they do not want this at all, according to their conception of the right of 
peoples (thus rejecting in hypothesi what is right in thesi); therefore, instead of 
the positive idea of a world republic (if not everything is to be lost) only the 
negative surrogate of a lasting and continually expanding league [Bund] that 
averts war can halt the stream of law-shunning and hostile inclination, but with a 
constant threat of its breaking out . . . (8:357)  
As established earlier, leaving the state of nature is an obligation of reason and 
it is no different for states. The above passage mentions specifically that reason 
demands, as it does for individuals, for states to leave the state of nature and 
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give up their external sovereignty in order to subject themselves to coercive 
international law (6:344).  
 
It is commonly held among Kantian scholars that Kant argued that the association 
of states is a good idea in theory, but impractical in reality (Kleingeld, 2004, pp 
306). One notable scholar is Kevin Dodson, who claimed that Kant is making a 
very ‘un-Kantian’ move:  
This argument, however, explicitly accepts the subordination of considerations of 
justice to empirical judgments of what is realistic in the near future . . . In putting 
forth this argument, Kant succumbs to the very same weakness that he so often 
warns us against—leaving us with only a ‘surrogate’ arrangement so that 
something can be salvaged’ (Dodson, 1993, pp 7). 
Michael Doyle also believes that Kant ‘favours a mutual non-aggression pact’ as 
per the league of nations and rejects the universal monarchy and association of 
states as they will either be impossible or, in the case of the universal monarchy, 
tyrannical (Doyle, 2012, pp 26). The practical impossibility of establishing the 
association of states is a present theme across Kant’s discussion of 
supranational institutions. Its improbability is referred to by Kant in the following 
passage:  
Because for too large an extension of such a state of nations over broad stretches 
of land, governing it and thus protecting each member of it must in the final 
analysis be impossible. A number of such states of nations, however, would in 
turn lead to a state of war, making perpetual peace (the final goal of all 
international law) admittedly an unrealisable idea (6:350).   
 
From the above, we can gather that Kant has a number of practical concerns with 
the association of states. He worries about the extent to which the internal 
business of each state ought to be subject to laws from a supranational body, as 
well as how effectively this body could actually govern.  Additionally, Kant is also 
concerned by the possibility of competing associations of states. For instance, if 
there was a western and an eastern alliance, this could lead to rivalries which 
impede the evolution of perpetual peace. We can see from this, then, that 
pragmatism is one of the main driving forces behind Kant’s decision to support 
the league of nations over the association of states. This pragmaticism relates 
 82 
specifically to how each state should progress into the ideal of the republic. This 
transition period will work at different speeds and in different ways depending 
upon the empirical realities confronting the state at any point in time. That being 
said, Kant does not disregard the principles of the association of states. Instead, 
we can begin to view the association of states in a similar vein to the ‘state in the 
ideal’ as discussed earlier in the first chapter. The association of states 
represents an ideal that states are supposed to aim for, regardless of whether 
achieving it is actually possible:  
The political principles, however, that aim toward it [perpetual peace], namely, to 
enter into such unions of states which serve to continually approximate it 
[perpetual peace], are not [unattainable] (6:350).  
Rather than being a realistic option, the association of states is instead a corollary 
to the ideal constitution on the domestic level.  
 
Yet questions remain.  If the state of states (association of states) is an 
unachievable aim and the universal monarchy ruled out, practically speaking 
leaving only the league of states, how are states supposed justifiably to leave the 
state of nature? If public law is required to leave the state of nature, the league 
of states cannot provide this. Hence one could question whether or not states 
that have formed a league of states have really left the state of nature, since there 
is no coercive force of public law existing between the states underlying and 
justifying the transition.  
 
Perhaps the answer to this conundrum is found in Kant’s underlying commitment 
to the notion of progress.  While it is true that a league of states will not provide 
fully conclusive rights among states, we ought to understand that Kant believed 
that forming a league of states is a sign of vital moral progress ‘beyond the state 
of nature among states, even though it is not enough to make rights hold 
conclusively (Bernstein, 2008, pp 80).’ While it is inferior to the association of 
states in the sense that rights will not be conclusive, it is certainly preferable to 
the state of nature.  
 
We can see this belief clearly in the Doctrine of Right, in which Kant explained 
his ideas with a new term, the ‘congress of states’ (6:351). Kant draws clear 
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parallels between the ‘congress of states’ and the league of nations in Perpetual 
Peace:    
By a congress is here understood only a voluntary [willkürliche] coalition of 
different states which can be dissolved at any time, not a federation (like that of 
the American states) which is based on a constitution and can therefore not be 
dissolved. – Only by such a congress can the idea of a public right of nations be 
realised, one to be established for deciding their disputes in a civil way as if by a 
lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way (the way of savages), namely by war 
(6:351). 
 
While Kant refers to the league as the congress of states here, it is clear that this 
is still the league of states due to Kant’s specification that there is no constitution 
among states (no codified, enforceable laws between the states). The league of 
states will allow states another avenue by which they can settle differences, 
namely, by lawsuit or arbitration. As Bernstein remarks, Kant believes that any 
form of state is better than the state of nature52; controversially, Kant even 
suggested that a despotic state is a sign of moral progress beyond the state of 
nature (Bernstein, 2008, pp 81). Kant’s prohibition against revolution is a sign of 
this, as he did not want states to ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’ and 
return to a state of nature just because a state has devolved into despotism.  
 
It is clear, from Kant’s advocacy of the league of states in both Perpetual Peace 
and the Doctrine of Right (known as the ‘congress of states’ here), that Kant does 
not believe that states can only offer a guarantee of peace in an association of 
states, the league of states can also serve this purpose. Consequently, we can 
gather that a league of states, regardless of the lack of coercive force among 
member states, is a better option than remaining in a state of nature.  
 
Kant’s ideal method of international government, then, is the state of states qua 
association of states. This is the institution that ‘reason dictates’ states should 
bind together to form. It is distinct from the idea of the world government, as there 
is no over-arching, centralised government. It is also preferable to the league of 
 
52 Although this will not include barbaric or anarchic regimes as both are considered to be forms 
of the state of nature (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 91). 
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states, as this can only achieve a surrogate of perpetual peace. That being said, 
while achieving an association of states may not be possible it is not a reason to 
ignore the political principles that approximate it. With this in mind, the league of 
nations is preferable to the state of nature and states should certainly form a 
league of nations.53 Despite lacking coercive laws, the league of nations can bring 
states closer together, bringing them closer to the condition of perpetual peace. 
The remaining issue then is that of how rights are to be enforced among member 
states of either the I or the league of nations. If an association of states is realised, 
how will right be enforced? If a league of nations is realised, how will law be 
enforced in an institution with no means to do so?  
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce possible supra-national 
organisations or institutions considered by Kant that might provide contexts in 
which the refugee right described in the prior chapter may be enforced 
internationally. This chapter opened with a brief recap of the obligation of 
individuals to form a juridical state and leave the state of nature. It then accepted 
the existence of an international state of nature applying to states themselves, 
and an obligation of states to leave it for a state of states. Finally, I explored the 
possible forms an international juridical state might take, examining the three 
different models Kant proposed. Both the association of states and the league of 
states appeared to provide grounds and scope for some kind of international law.  
The task now will be to investigate whether and to what degree such institutions 








53 It is unclear whether or not Kant imagines a single league that continues to expand as nations 
grow more enlightened, or whether multiple leagues will spring up. The former would be 
consistent with Kant’s belief of perpetual peace, however, with several leagues being likely to 
drive war. An example of this from history would be the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, 
with the alliance system ultimately helping to trigger World War One.   
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Chapter Four: Law and Coercion in an International Juridical State  
 
The prior two chapters of this thesis focussed on constructing a clear account of 
refugee right in principle from Kant’s wider political writings. This concept of 
refugee right was found to be consistent with external freedom and the principle 
of right, being drawn from both the law of hospitality and the original right to 
possession of the Earth’s surface. Following the second chapter, the focus of the 
thesis shifted in order to understand how a refugee right could be implemented 
internationally, in a similar manner to how rights are implemented domestically. 
If there is no clear and principled account of implementation, then even the most 
basic right to non-refoulement would be rendered merely academic. One of the 
central ideas in Kant’s philosophy is the idea of the state of nature and how 
individuals are obligated to leave this state to form a juridical state. Chapter Three 
examined the idea of the juridical state and, in a further effort to see how a 
refugee right could be enforced internationally, examined whether Kant had also 
written about a juridical state succeeding a state of nature in the international 
sphere. In Chapter Three, we found that Kant did indeed write about an 
‘international state of nature’ that should be abandoned for the sake of an 
international juridical state, but questions nevertheless remain over how a 
refugee right could be enforced between states. The aim of the present chapter 
will be to address these remaining questions. The chapter begins by explaining 
why it is difficult to find principled grounds for the enforceability of international 
law in Kant. However, further exploration of Kant’s bigger picture raises the 
possibility that implementation of refugee right in the real world would be linked 
to moral progress and ideas of self-enforcement, rather than dependent on 
externally applied coercion, at the level of international relations. 
 
1. The Kantian State and Problems With Inter-State Coercion  
This section will be divided into two subsections to highlight the two clearest 
elements of a state according to Kant, viz., that a state is the result of a united 
will, and that a state is considered sovereign.  
 
Examining the above elements will help elucidate the difficulty in conceiving an 
association of states) that enforces an international law between juridical states 
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within the association, showing why there is a difference between coercion of 
individuals in a juridical nation-state and coercion of states in an association of 
states. 
 
1.1 – The United Will 
Chapter One of this thesis elucidated Kant’s account of an individual’s obligation 
to leave the state of nature. In the state of nature, humans possess rights without 
any means to enforce those rights, bar their own strength. People are, therefore, 
obligated by reason to submit themselves before public coercive laws, according 
to the postulate of public right and enter into a civil condition:  
From private right in the state of nature there proceeds the postulate of public 
right: When you cannot avoid living side by side with others you ought to leave 
the state of nature and proceed with them into the rightful condition, that is, a 
condition of distributive justice (6:307). 
 
The shift from a state of nature in which rights are provisional, to a juridical state 
in which rights are conclusive secures a moral agent’s choice to make it 
compatible with everyone’s outer freedom and introduces a means by which 
those rights can be enforced (a condition of distributive justice). Consequently, 
the state is a representation of the united will of the citizenry and, according to 
Kant, allows the people to ‘[govern] themselves through their own legislation, and 
the state enacts and enforces this law (if it does not contradict a priori law or 
natural laws of freedom) (Byrd, 1995, pp 176)’. In other words, this allows us to 
interpret the united will of the people in such a way that the united will of the 
people is the state, and it is the united will of the people that generates the 
existence of sovereignty. For, a state is a collection of people and therefore it is 
the united will of the people that is sovereign. An examination of Kant’s 
terminology will also help support this viewpoint.  
 
Kant frequently uses the German ‘Völkerstaat’ in relation to the association of 
states, despite Volk being accurately translated as ‘people’ (Kleingeld, 2004, pp 
305). Kant, it seems, uses the term ‘people’ to refer to a group of individuals 
united under common law to forma juridical state. This reading is further 
confirmed by the passage at the beginning of Perpetual Peace where Kant notes 
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that he is discussing ‘peoples as states’ (8:344). Hence as Kleingeld warns that 
when reading Kant, one should keep in mind that Kant saw the political state as 
being the self-organisation of individuals and did not regard the right of states as 
independent from the rights of individuals (Kleingeld, 2004, pp 309). This is 
reflected clearly in the following extract from Kant’s Doctrine of Right: 
A state (civitas) is a union of a multitude of human beings under laws of right. 
Insofar as these are a priori necessary as laws, that is, insofar as they follow of 
themselves from concepts of external right as such (are not statutory), its form is 
the form of a state as such, that is, of the state in idea, as it ought to be in 
accordance with pure principles of right. This idea serves as a norm (norma) for 
every actual union into a commonwealth (hence serves as a norm for its internal 
constitution) (6:313). 
So, under the state in the idea the united will in intrinsically connected to the 
state.54   Kant clearly affirms that a state is simply ‘a union of a multitude of human 
beings under the laws of right’. It is also worth noting that the United States of 
America was founded upon this very belief. In his 2018 book Identity, Francis 
Fukuyama claims that ‘the constitution says clearly that the people are sovereign 
and that the legitimate government flows from their will. But it does not define 
who the people are, or on what basis individuals are to be included in the national 
community (Fukuyama, 2018, pp 206).’55 Thus for Kant sovereignty is a 
consequence of the united will of the people and is therefore dependent upon the 
existence of that united will.  
 
1.2 Sovereignty and Equality of States 
State sovereignty means that all states are equal according to international right. 
As Byrd observed, Kant does not hold that a state can obtain ‘moral value greater 
than its components, or that it deserves respect or that it is conceived in a holistic 
way (Byrd, 1995, pp 180)’. The state humbly exists as a vessel through which 
right can be protected and enforced. The prior section showed that it is the people 
that give the state its moral status, and other states must respect this value. On 
these grounds there is no justification for some states forcing other states to join 
or form an association or league of states. 
 
54 As discussed in Chapter One  




The reason Kant gives for why states can’t be coerced into a supranational 
organisation (and why states must respect the constitutions of other states) is 
that states have an internal constitution. Kant describes juridical states as having 
‘outgrown’ coercion by others, meaning that law is present within the state after 
a people have united under a common will:  
Since, as states, they already have a rightful constitution internally and hence 
have outgrown the constraint of others to bring them under a more extended law-
governed constitution in accordance with their concepts of right (8:355-56). 
 
The above shows that, while the domestic sphere allows for individuals to coerce 
each other into joining a civil condition, this does not hold on the international 
level as there is already an internal constitution. If a state is a juridical state, there 
is already a rule of law. If that same state in an international condition comes 
under new juridical laws its people have not legislated themselves, the situation 
these citizens now find themselves in may not normatively be better than the one 
that already existed in their state. It might be worse. (Kleingeld, 2004, pp 310). 
For Kant, sovereignty must be juridical:  
What holds in accordance with natural right for human beings in a lawless 
condition, [that] ‘they ought to leave this condition’, cannot hold for states in 
accordance with the right of nations (since, as states, they already have a rightful 
constitution internally and have hence outgrown the constraint of others to bring 
them under a more extended law-governed constitution in accordance with their 
concepts of right) (8:355-356).  
As Flikschuh observes: given ‘their moral status, states ought to submit under a 
supra-state public authority’, but due to ‘the grounds of their moral status they 
cannot do so, but must treat themselves and one another as juridically sovereign 
agents (Flikschuh, 2010, pp 481).’ 
 
Besides the issue of non-coercibility of states into greater unions, other issues 
arise in regard to how an association of states (however it may come to exist) 
may enforce its laws on member states.56 Katrin Flikschuh raises a conceptual 
 
56 Kant didn’t explain how an association of states would enforce its laws upon its member 
states, so the nature of the enforcing body is mysterious. One could assume that it would be 
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problem with international coercion in order to elucidate the problems of law 
enforcement within the association of states. As explained above, a state is 
sovereign because its existence (as a state) flows from the united will of its 
people. Consequently, the state exists in order to protect, enforce, and distribute 
the will of its citizens.  In the international sphere, however, there is no justification 
for coercing states into larger unions. Kleingeld helps to highlight the difference 
between domestic and international coercion more clearly in the following 
passage:  
When individuals leave the state of nature to submit to laws of a common state, 
the state they form may not be perfect, but it will be better, normatively speaking, 
than the state of nature that they left behind because before its creation there 
was no rule of law at all (Kleingeld, 2004, pp 308). 
The protection from outside interference and the equality of all states leads to a 
dilemma in how an international right could be enforced by an association of 
states. As Flikschuh writes:  
[Kant] designates states as supreme enforcers of Right domestically, yet he also 
thinks of states as bearers of juridical obligations internationally. If Right in 
general is inherently coercive then states, in honouring their juridical obligations, 
should submit under a supra-state juridical authority internationally. Yet if states 
are themselves supreme enforcers of Right, they cannot be juridically 
compelled—the application of Right against them cannot be coercive. This is 
Kant’s sovereignty dilemma (Flikschuh, 2010, pp 471).  
 
Every state must have a relationship of legislating body and obeying subject. 
More specifically, in the juridical state the legislator is also the legislated, as the 
citizen agrees to the laws that they will follow. However, as Flikschuh suggests, 
the concept of a state being subject to external laws would be contradictory: ‘the 
concept of state is made to occupy the position of superior and inferior, ruler and 
ruled, simultaneously (Flikschuh, 2010, pp 479)’. As opposed to individuals, a 
state’s possession of ‘sovereign authority’ is essential to the moral personality of 
a state. Flikschuh argues that, ‘the juridical compulsion of states would 
compromise their moral personality’ (Flikschuh, 2010, pp 480). Their moral status 
 
some supra-state authority akin to the United Nations’ Peace Force, but the remainder of this 
section will simply imply it is the association of states (as a legal entity) enforcing public law.  
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compels them to treat each other as juridically sovereign agents. It is for this 
reason that Kant cannot support an association of states with the power to 
enforce law between its member states and instead settles on a non-coercive 
league of nations. This non-coercive league of nations would open up channels 
for states to communicate and (hopefully) find a peaceful solution to their 
conflicts, though without the finality in judgement of an association of states under 
the power of public law.  
 
Nevertheless, the prohibition on coercion (whether it be between states already 
in an association of states or between states into creating an association of 
states) is not a prohibition against self-defence of states. Kant does write about 
‘injuries against states’ and explains in significant detail when states are 
permitted to use force against another state. Rather, this prohibition against 
coercion is focussed on constitutional change, i.e., on one state imposing its law 
upon another state. In the Chapter Three I explained how the citizen of juridical 
state is both the legislator and the legislated, meaning that a citizen subjects 
themselves to laws that they have agreed to follow. However, a state coercing 
another on the basis of laws not legislated by nor consented to by its citizens 
would violate that state’s united ‘self-legislative’ will.  In addition, permitting 
coercion runs the risk of unwilling republics being forced into a despotic or 
barbaric association of states57.  Or the reverse, where a republican and ‘just’ 
state of states forces despotic states to join their organisation unwillingly – 
treating them paternalistically58 (Bernstein, 2008, pp 77). Either way, both of 
these situations are violations of the rights of nations and individuals.  
 
This section so far has shown that for Kant states cannot be coerced by other 
states due to a state’s internal constitution. In other words, a state that already 
has an internal constitution from the united common will of its subjects cannot be 
compelled into following another state’s will. This means that an enforceable 
 
57 For instance, if the Allies lost to the Axis Powers, we may have had a Third Reich-esque state 
of states across Europe. Or, perhaps more historically, the Soviet Bloc was arguably an 
example of a barbaric/totalitarian ‘state of states’. The Soviet Union suppressed resistance 
movements and independence movements for decades, denying the people of 
Romania/Poland/ East Germany and so on, the chance to unite and form a constitution.   
58 Kant spoke of this in his section on Cosmopolitan Right in Perpetual Peace, most notably as 
a critique of imperialism.  
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refugee right, a law that permits another state or an international organisation 
(EU/UN) to coerce a state to accept a certain number of refugees against that 
state’s will would be a violation of the right of nations. A state exists because its 
people have united into a common will, entailing sovereignty.59 If a state is 
coerced by another state (whether this be into forming an association of states or 
by this association after its formation), then this would be a violation of the right 
of a people to self-legislate.  
 
The lack of an ability to enforce right would be problematic for aspirations for real 
world implementation of refugee right. According to the conclusions of Chapter 
Three:  
• One state cannot force its laws onto another state in the sphere of 
international relations. 
• A supranational organisation cannot impose top-down laws on member 
states, for this would violate the right of a people to self-legislate.  
An attempt by a supra-state of states to either force states into its union or force 
its laws onto another state within the union would be clearly a violation of every 
right of nations detailed in both Perpetual Peace and the Doctrine of Right.  
 
If a supranational organisation cannot enforce law upon its member states, what 
then would be the value or purpose of such an international institution? It seems 
a state of nature between member states would still exist and refugee right would 
remain merely ‘provisional’ because ultimately unenforceable. Possessing a right 
is useless if others can simply ignore it. The league of nations as defined by Kant 
does not possess any coercive power, and it seems that even the ideal 
association of states would have trouble implementing a refugee right without 
violating the united will of state citizens. That being said, there remains still one 
avenue provided by Kant’s philosophy that allows for some kind of realisation of 
refugee right on an international stage.  
 
 
59 As explained in Chapter One, a united common will does not mean that citizens are in 
agreement upon every law and so on and so forth. The common will is simply the legislating 
power of the majority of citizens, the power by which laws are created for and by the people of a 
state.  
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2. Moral Progress  
So far, I have attempted to elucidate the difficulties involved in regard to 
enforcement of refugee right between member states of the association of states. 
The key difficulty arises from the fact that states have ‘outgrown’ coercion due to 
their internal constitution, preventing any form of interference from foreign entities 
on their internal constitution. Additionally, a central issue with the notion that 
states will agree to follow rules on the basis that others do the same, is that 
international treaties and rules are constantly being abandoned and changed. 
Therefore, the remainder of this chapter and final discussion of the thesis will shift 
from consideration of coercion to the idea that implementation of refugee rights 
may be best guaranteed in the context of moral progress.  
 
States are not static, political blocks that persist throughout history; for instance, 
treaties signed in 1987 between superpowers may be torn up thirty-two years 
later.60 On the other hand, a Prime Minister may promise membership of some 
kind of international alliance only to lose an election to a politician who 
campaigned on a contrary mandate. In more Kantian terms, an agreement by a 
state to follow Rule X without any form of coercion would appear to be similar to 
two thieves in the state of nature, promising not to steal from each other. While 
coercion will not be able to ensure international law, perhaps moral progress will, 
ultimately, have greater effect. While my argument here will undoubtedly be 
optimistic with its descriptions of human moral progress and its impact on states, 
optimism is a present theme across Kant’s political philosophy and its importance 
to the realisation or approximation of Perpetual Peace ought not be ignored. This 
section will therefore highlight Kant’s notions of enlightenment and moral 
progress of the individual, showing how the development of individuals is 
important in realising the conditions of perpetual peace globally. More 
specifically, the remainder of this chapter will argue that, rather than there being 
a supranational and enforceable refugee right, any form of refugee right will have 
to be self-enforcing within the state (as a direct result of moral progress).  
 
 
60  BBC News. (2019). US pulls out of nuclear treaty with Russia. [online] Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565 [Accessed 20 Sep. 2019]. 
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In order to explain the role of moral progress in securing perpetual peace, we 
need to remember that Kant’s public right is tripartite. This means that all three 
pillars of public right must be fulfilled before perpetual peace can be achieved.61 
For Kant, if we are to approximate perpetual peace, we ought to pursue all pillars 
of public right:  
If the principle of outer freedom limited by laws is lacking in any one of these 
three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all the others is 
unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse (6:311). 
While the above quote could be taken to the extreme in suggesting that rights 
can only be made conclusive in a condition of perpetual peace, I believe that we 
can use it to highlight the importance of all pillars working together. As Doyle 
observes:  
Not one of these constitutional, international or cosmopolitan sources is alone 
sufficient, but together (and only where together) they plausibly connect the 
characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace 
(Doyle, 2012, pp 88).  
Further, there was no implied chronological order to the public right. For instance, 
a despotic state may be permitted to join a league of nations or trade with juridical 
states (Bernstein, 2008, pp 81).62 The importance of the domestic and 
cosmopolitan rights to moral progress will be explored in two subsections; the 
first focussing on the importance of the republican state to perpetual peace and 
the second focussing on cosmopolitan right.  
 
2.1 – Domestic Right 
The importance of Kant’s juridical state to his ideals of perpetual peace cannot 
be overstated. While the juridical state is an important feature in Kant’s notion of 
public right, as shown in Chapter One, it is also a vital aspect of perpetual peace 
on the global stage. The importance of the juridical state stretches far wider than 
 
61 The three pillars are: the republican state, international law, and cosmopolitan law.  
62 The question of barbaric states, however, would be more contentious. While one could argue 
that ‘keeping your enemies closer’ could be a valid policy here, we ought to remember that the 
barbaric state is one in which a juridical state is impossible to come about naturally. In other 
words, a despotic state may eventually evolve into a republic; whereas a barbaric state will 
require some element of resistance or revolution. A condition of trade (supporting the regime), 
could prolong the barbaric rule – prolonging the existence of a state whose maxim is contrary to 
perpetual peace. However, on the other hand, those barbaric regimes often run their nation in 
such a way that their subjects are poverty stricken and starving. Consequently, one could argue 
that refusing to trade or give aid to these nations would only harm its citizens.  
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simply enforcing and protecting the freedom of its citizens. In Perpetual Peace, 
Kant’s First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace requires ‘every state to be 
republican’, showing that Kant saw republicanism, or the juridical state, as being 
a vital step toward eternal, perpetual peace (8:349-50). The clearest reason for 
this from Kant is that he saw a juridical state as being less likely to go to war than 
a despotic nation. Kant’s reasoning was that, as the citizens must be in favour of 
war for it to be justified, juridical states are less likely to go to war than a despotic 
state:  
If, as is inevitably the case under this constitution, the consent of the citizens is 
required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they 
will have great hesitation in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise. For this 
means calling down on themselves all the miseries of war (8:351). 
 
The above quote reveals far more about Kant’s juridical state than its likelihood 
of peaceful foreign policy. Kant’s explanation of why a juridical state is less likely 
to go to war also highlights the fact that the executive cannot introduce a new law 
without imposing it on themselves. Without presupposing that the British political 
system would be a Kantian republic, Philip Pettit explains this succinctly with his 
example of the British Parliament, ‘Members of the British Parliament fall under 
the laws they pass for Britain… and so the British Parliament cannot impose a 
tax on the people of Britain without imposing it on themselves’ (Pettit, 1997, pp 
175)63. This notion of ‘one rule for all’ also applies for law breaking. The citizens 
of a Kantian juridical state have the power to restrain their leaders and control the 
direction their country will take. For instance, the judiciary has the power to 
remove an executive if it is determined that they abused their position or broke 
the law (6:313). This fits into Philip Pettit’s exploration of the ‘empire of law’ that 
governments ‘should be forced to act always in a principled, law-like way. They 
should be permitted to act only under the authority of law, and only in a way that 
accords with the requirements of the law’ (Pettit, 1997, pp 175). In addition to 
separating the powers of government and allowing for checks and balances to 
power, the juridical state guarantees individuals freedom, equality, and 
 
63 It is important to keep in mind that Kant probably has the Ancient Greek notions of democratic 
government in mind here. Byrd and Hruschka believe that Kant would probably see ‘our notion’ 
of a democratic government as an ‘elected aristocracy’ (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 179).  
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‘dependence of all on a single common legislation (as subjects)’ (6:311-318). As 
explained at length in Chapter One, Kant’s juridical state is one that places 
external freedom at its centre, distributing justice according to right equally across 
all citizens. With this in mind, Kant writes that a juridical state’s constitution draws 
citizens in via their naturalistic impulses and selfish desires: 
Hence reason can use the mechanism of nature, in the form of selfish 
inclinations, which by their nature oppose one another even externally, as a 
means to make room for reason’s own end, legal regulation, and to thereby 
promote and secure, insofar as it is within the power of the state to do so, both 
internal and external peace (8:367). 
So, while the main aim of the juridical state is to enforce right, Kant believes that 
enforcing these rights will eventually lead to a love for law, developing a moral 
disposition among the citizens, as Kant said in Perpetual Peace:  
[civil law in accordance with the freedom and equality of the individual] actually 
facilitates the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law 
by placing a barrier against the outbreak of unlawful inclinations (8:350).  
 
Therefore, Kant also believes that juridical states foster the moral development 
of individuals, allowing citizens to become more enlightened by protecting, 
enforcing, and combining ‘moral autonomy, individualism, and social order’ 
(Doyle, 2012, pp 26). The notion of enlightenment was very important to Kant, 
with Kant himself being one of the most important figures of the Enlightenment 
period. As with his moral philosophy, Kant’s notion of enlightenment was strongly 
tied to the concept of reason. In his essay ‘An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?’, Kant argues that an enlightened individual is one who thinks for 
oneself (Rauscher, 2017). Kant even went on to describe enlightenment as the 
‘maxim of always thinking for oneself (8:146)’. This notion of enlightenment was 
tied closely to that of free speech, with Kant suggesting that citizens should 
question orders from superiors using their reason. It is for this reason that Kant 
argues free speech (freedom of the pen) is ‘the sole palladium’ in how citizens 
are able to stake claim to rights (8:304). With this in mind, Peters writes that a 
juridical state allows individuals to ‘pursue his or her own type of happiness most 
freely and could develop his or her own rational gifts (Peters, 1993, pp 126)’.  
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Kant was clear in the role of the juridical state in fostering enlightenment and 
moral progress among its citizens: 
In the same way, we cannot expect their moral attitudes to produce a good 
political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people 
can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture (8:366). 
Doyle neatly summarises Kant’s beliefs around the necessity of the juridical state 
(republic) and its importance to liberal peace on the global stage:   
As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an 
understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes 
into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral 
foundations for the liberal peace (Doyle, 2012, pp 28).  
Therefore, in keeping with Kant’s idea that all three pillars of public right must be 
in in order before we can achieve perpetual peace and ‘provide a framework 
within which moral progress is possible (Hurrell, 1990, pp 198)’. Kant gave a 
description what he means by moral progress within this context in the following 
passage:  
Now, moral-practical Reason within us pronounces the following irresistible veto: 
There shall be no war . . . Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual 
peace is really possible or not, or whether we are not perhaps mistaken in our 
theoretical judgement if we assume that it is. On the contrary, we must simply act 
as if it could come about (which is perhaps impossible), and turn our efforts 
towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose 
(6:354).  
The significance behind Kant’s foregoing quote is not to describe how war could 
be rendered extinct, rather, it is focussed on the changing attitudes of peoples 
and their impact on political leadership (Peters, 1993, pp 126). An increase in 
juridical states will lead to an increase in moral enlightenment of citizens and 
fewer wars. It’s important to highlight here that moral enlightenment is driven by 
people, the existence of the juridical state takes moral enlightenment to the next 
level; protecting the rights of individuals by law and allowing moral development 
to continue. The idea here is that, as a people grow more enlightened so does 
their state – this is moral progress. The moral progress is driven by people, with 
the juridical state acting as a necessary catalyst in the progression of 
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enlightenment and moral progress among citizens with its liberal laws.64 The 
moral evolution of individuals allows a juridical state to change with its citizens, 
meaning that as a people become more enlightened so does a state. As juridical 
states spread across the globe, the capacity for freedom and the moral 
development of individuals will also expand (Doyle, 2012, pp 49). More Juridical 
states would free up the possibility of increased, more productive state interaction 
and a wider adoption of the cosmopolitan law, including foreign policy and issues 
relating to refugee right. Education, free speech, and the marketplace of ideas 
are crucial to achieving widespread acceptance, not only of the plight of refugees, 
but a global injustice as a whole. In this context, through education and 
enlightenment, the ‘people’ of a state may come to understand refugees as fellow 
citizens in the ‘society of humans’ as opposed to the ‘other’. As a result, the 
changing attitudes of people would lead to less resistance to refugee intake 
which, in turn, would be reflected in that state’s government policies.  
 
A wider adoption of the cosmopolitan law would also have a profound effect on 
wider discussions of refugee right. For instance, there would be fewer refugees 
within this utopian society, perhaps eventually rendering the idea of ‘refugee 
rights’ redundant. The reason for this is that, as most refugee crises are caused 
by war between states (World War Two, Vietnam), civil war (Syria), or state 
persecution (Nazi Germany and its treatment of the Jews), perpetual peace will 
solve all of these problems by eliminating war and spreading stable, liberal 
juridical states across the globe.  
 
Kant was clear in his writings that a ‘league of nations’ would help resolve 
international disputes and facilitate interactions between states, allowing for 
nations to resolve their disputes through other methods than violence and war. It 
is through this league of nations that Kant’s cosmopolitan right, and law of 
hospitality, becomes more possible. That being said, the question of refugee 
rights would be important even in a global state of perpetual peace. After all, war 
 
64 It’s worth mentioning here that Kant was writing during the age of enlightenment, a time in 
which science, technology, and philosophy were advancing at a stellar rate. It’s unclear 
whether, if Kant was writing today during the age of ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’, and echo 
chambers on social media, he would hold a similar view.  
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isn’t the only cause of refugees; natural disasters (and eventually climate change) 
can also contribute to refugee exoduses.  
 
2.2 – Cosmopolitan Right 
In addition to the role Kant afforded the juridical state in fostering moral 
development, he also emphasised the importance and purpose of ‘the 
cosmopolitan right’ in establishing of a state of perpetual peace. The 
cosmopolitan right, we have seen, is intended to enforce laws of hospitality and 
trade. The general idea behind the notion of cosmopolitan right is that it will help 
bring about a condition of perpetual peace by bringing peoples together, rather 
than nations. This appeal to trade helps to draw states together by introducing an 
element of self-interest to peace. In other words, the cosmopolitan right ‘adds 
material incentives to moral commitments (Doyle, 2012, pp 28).’  While the 
domestic right facilitates moral development at home, the cosmopolitan right is 
intended to foster this attitude change on a global scale. This right allows peoples 
to interact, exchange ideas, stories, and share cultural customs, showing how 
enlightenment and education can help bring states closer together. Crucially to 
this thesis, the cosmopolitan right also contains the law of hospitality, so realising 
a cosmopolitan right between states is vital if states are to adhere to the form of 
refugee right described in Chapter Two.  
 
Hurrell describes the cosmopolitan right as the process ‘by which individuals 
become increasingly able to see themselves as part of a global community of 
mankind, a universal cosmopolitan existence (Hurrell, 1990, pp 198)’. Hurrell 
writes that ‘whilst obligations to the nation state would not (nor should not) 
disappear, the range of moral obligation could expand beyond the state and that 
individuals could develop a growing sense of moral interdependence (Hurrell, 
1990, pp 198)’. Kant, presenting a classical liberal argument, assumes that the 
economic benefits of peace will help to facilitate a period without war from which 
peoples could work closely and ‘lead toward a general agreement on the 
principles for peace and understanding’:  
For the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it 
cannot exist side by side with war . . . Thus states find themselves compelled to 
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promote the noble cause of peace, though not exactly from motives of morality 
(8:358).65  
 
According to Bernstein, ‘Kant conjectures that human inclinations can lead states 
toward peace. Sooner or later, he says, the spirit of commerce ‘takes hold of 
every nation (Bernstein, 2008, pp 79)’. In other words, the magnetic force that 
money provides ‘may well be the most reliable of all the powers (means) 
subordinate to that of a state’ that could ‘promote honourable peace and, 
whenever war threatens to break out anywhere in the world, to prevent it by 
mediation, just as if they were in a permanent league for this purpose (Bernstein, 
2008, pp 79).’66 In Chapter Three, we explored the universal monarchy, the state 
of states (association of states), and the league of nations. Unlike the state of 
states, the league of nations had no coercive power, simply relying on state 
cooperation to help foster peace. As I showed in Chapter Three, the league of 
nations was criticised by some Kantian scholars, including Byrd and Hruschka, 
for its lack of coercive power. However, a league of nations that builds up and 
relies on moral progress and cooperation to attain a condition of peace will favour 
and find success via the carrot rather than the stick. For instance, the EU started 
as a trading block in the 1950s, then known as the European Coal and Steel 
Community, before slowly expanding and introducing more guidelines for its 
members, including the European Court of Human Rights.67 The EU can serve 
as an example for how the trading incentive of nations can help bring about an 
international right that can add layers of ‘cosmopolitan right’ among member 
states over time, including a refugee right. While the spirit of commerce may draw 
states in out of self-interest, the triumvirate of public right is also intended to foster 
a natural evolution toward peace on an individual moral level. In other words, it is 
 
65 As I write this, there is a ‘trade-war’ between the USA and China, the concept of which may 
have shocked Kant. Although, a trade war is evidently preferable to a ‘classic’ war.  
66 ‘Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, 
publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to 
hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free 
speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign 
peoples is essential to establish and preserve the understanding on which the guarantee of 
respect depends. In short, domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign 
republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience 
of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behaviour when the consequences of state 
policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial (Doyle, 2012, pp 28).’  
67 This is not to suggest that the EU is what Kant had in mind with his league of nations, there 
are several issues with the EU that would not be considered Kantian. 
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to foster a will for peace that will eventually spread across the globe. This means 
that, in this idealised and enlightened state, it will be the will of the people that is 
self-enforcing. The consequences for the league of nations and agreements 
between states would be that these states would want to follow rules rather than 
being forced to do so. In such ideal circumstances, states would not need to be 
coerced into following international or cosmopolitan right. Rather, they would 
willingly choose to cooperate with international and cosmopolitan right, as well as 
with the law of hospitality and its entailing refugee right.  
 
Disagreements would still occur between states, regardless of how enlightened 
they may be, but an ‘arbitration procedure’ between states, such as the one 
provided by the league of nations, would be sufficient, according to Bernstein. 
This procedure would allow for international disputes, including refugee crises, to 
be decided ‘in a civil way, as if by lawsuit’ (Bernstein, 2008, pp 83; 6:351). On 
this view, states would make clear and ‘explicit commitments to each other’ that 
they will abide by certain agreements, including non-aggression, mutual 
disarmament, and of course, handling humanitarian crises including refugee 
exoduses. Bernstein proposes that states would endorse a treaty, potentially 
containing the preliminary articles for perpetual peace stated by Kant and agree 
to follow this treaty on the guarantee that other signatory states would also agree 
to do so (Bernstein, 2008, pp 83). The signatory states may sign up to the treaty 
from either self-interest or practical reason/ morality, but either way the result 
would be one of peace. This would lay the groundwork for more progressive 
policies in the future, including a refugee right/ law of hospitality. As Hurrell neatly 
states, ‘by focussing on the need and possibility of progress of both individuals 
and states, Kant can envisage a situation in which states will be able to cooperate 
in a way which was previously impossible (Hurrell, 1990, pp 199)’.  
 
3. Self-Enforcing Refugee Right and the Veil of Vagueness  
One of the main concerns about an unenforceable refugee right is the idea that 
states will not act during refugee crises because there is no direct order for them 
to do so. In other words, even if there is an expectation within a league of nations 
that states will help control and distribute refugees during a refugee crisis, some 
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states may take a back seat, expecting other states in the league to handle the 
situation without law-like coercion to enforce action.  
 
This is the worry of both Seyla Behabib and Howard Williams, who both believe 
that a state’s duties to foreigners and foreign states operate behind a ‘veil of 
vagueness’ (Benhabib, 2004, pp 31). This comes from the fact that, while states 
may accept that there is a general duty to act, they may not believe it applies to 
them (Altman, 2017, pp 190). Refugee right may be a right that a claimant 
possesses but is unable to have enforced as no specific agent has a duty to 
enforce that right (O’Neill, 2000, pp 53). However, this veil of vagueness concern 
is not necessarily an argument that the concept of Kant’s notions of moral 
progress/league of nations ought to be abandoned or that they would be useless 
in improving refugee right across the globe. The promises of moral progress, as 
outlined in the prior sections, have the potential to solve Benhabib and Williams’ 
worry of the veil of vagueness.  
 
If international crises are to occur, they may be resolved effectively through an 
international arbitration system. Similarly, if a humanitarian crisis is to give rise to 
an exodus of refugees, the distribution of refugees is more likely to be handled 
effectively if states work together within a league of nations that provides an 
avenue of information, communication, and perhaps even monetary or 
infrastructure assistance. In other words, moral progress and the league of 
nations may allow states to effectively distribute the weight of refugee right (or 
other forms of international right) and remove the ‘veil of vagueness’.  
 
With regard to the specific application of refugee right, we have recently seen 
several EU states accept an arrangement that will redistribute refugees fairly 
across the fourteen signatory states.68 In a recent Guardian article entitled ‘EU 
countries agree plan to handle migrants and refugees’, it is revealed that six 




69 One of those states was Italy, one of the nations that bore the brunt of the 2016 refugee crisis 
due its proximity to North Africa.  
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(and a ‘quasi’ league of nations) allows states to interact with one another and, 
despite absence of coercive force, introduce a measure that would fit neatly 
within the cosmopolitan right. The introduction to this thesis posed the question: 
‘if a humanitarian crisis causes an exodus of refugees and a nearby juridical state 
refuses to give them hospitality, how could a refugee’s cosmopolitan right be 
enforced?’ The first thing that should be acknowledged now is that, in a Kantian 
framework, it would be impermissible to force one of those six European states 
to accept refugees if doing so would violate the united will (majority will) of the 
state’s people. Even if this veil of vagueness is removed, it ought to be 
remembered that ‘perfect protection’ as Byrd and Hruschka describe it, cannot 
be found in any state (Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 202). Even in a juridical state, 
crime will be committed, but we should not consider a ‘perfection or bust’ policy 
and return to the state of nature because of this inability to guarantee no crime. 
Likewise, even if war may break out between states or some states may refuse 
to accept a certain number of refugees, humanity should not give up on its goal 
of achieving a condition of peace or refugee right. As Kant stated, even if 
perpetual peace is an unachievable idea, we should still aim to follow those 
principles that direct us toward it:  
The political principles, however, that aim toward it [perpetual peace], namely to 
enter into such unions of states which serve to continually approximate it 
[perpetual peace], are not [unattainable] (6:350).  
 
As with the domestic state, even if the perfect constitution is unattainable70, the 
state should aim to get as close to this constitution as possible.  
We have the duty to continue to try to establish the conditions in which rights can 
hold conclusively, even though they will always hold less than conclusively in 
some respects or to some degree (Bernstein, 2008, pp 80).  
Similarly, states have a duty to try and get as close to the ideals of perpetual 
peace as possible, as stated more poetically in On the Common Saying:  
This progress may at times be interrupted but never broken off… history may well 
give rise to endless doubts about my hopes, and if these doubts could be proved, 
they might persuade me to desist from an apparently futile task. But so long as 
 
70 As shown in Chapter One, the State in the Ideal is unattainable yet states should still work to 
get as close as possible to this ideal.   
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they do not have the force of certainty, I cannot exchange my duty (as a liquidum) 
for a rule of expediency which says that I ought not to attempt the impractical 
(i.e., the illiquidum), since it is purely hypothetical (8:308-309).  
 
In other words, although perpetual peace may be impossible, we should still 
make this our end and replicate its ideals as closely as possible (Bernstein, 2008, 
pp 60; Byrd and Hruschka, 2011, pp 203). The right of individuals to a place on 
Earth can be respected by states in the non-coercive league of nations that Kant 
favoured as a pragmatic alternative to the association of states. While it would 
not offer the conclusive guarantees of the association of states, the league of 
nations is still preferable to the state of nature and does offer some avenues by 
which states could utilise to implement certain codes of conduct, such as original 
right to a place on Earth (refugee right), non-aggression, sanctions, and so on. 
Therefore, while this chapter began with the idea of implementing a coercive right 
(analogous to the domestic state) among states that could enforce refugee right, 
it has come to the conclusion that such coercion would not be justifiable or 
possible among juridical states within Kant’s political framework. Rather, full 
implementation of refugee right will be based in the will of the people and would 
be self-enforcing in the context of moral progress. 
 
The notions of moral progress and self-enforcement explored in this chapter are 
admittedly idealistic and optimistic. Moral progress depends upon a global 
community growing together over time, rather than apart. Moral progress 
depends upon states growing gradually more republican, rather than leaning to 
totalitarianism. Finally, moral progress also depends upon world leaders listening 
to the demands of their educated and reflective citizens. While there are clear 
issues that one could raise with the optimistic account of moral progress 
presented here, issues that would require another thesis to sufficiently grapple 
with, the optimism of moral progress combined with the pragmatic account of the 
league of nations captures Kant’s own struggles between optimism and 
pessimism, as well as the idealistic and the pragmatic. Further, highlighting the 
importance of the both the moral individual and the republic places the possibility 
of perpetual peace firmly in humanity’s own hands. In a time of globalisation and 
unelected officials in charge of international organisations, restating the 
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This chapter highlighted the conceptual issues with enforcing a refugee right 
internationally according to Kantian principles. Due to the internal constitutions of 
states, those nations have ‘outgrown’ coercion. If coercion cannot be 
implemented internationally, the inevitable conclusion appeared to be that 
refugee right is not enforceable and, qua ‘right’, is rendered merely academic. 
Not wishing to rest with this conclusion, I set out to investigate how an 
international juridical state could implement laws with a degree of finality that 
would be analogous to the courts of the juridical state. While international 
coercion in a similar manner to domestic coercion would be a violation of the right 
of nations, Kant envisages an international body that does not rely on coercion – 
the league of nations. This body relies on states working together and resolving 
their disputes through methods other than violence. With this in mind, I explored 
Kant’s notions of moral progress, showing how the growth of juridical states 
across the globe brings states closer together as they interact, trade, and, 
hopefully, form a league of nations. Kant’s notion of moral progress was 
highlighted as a possible solution and vital pathway to the implementation of 
refugee rights in the absence of inter-state coercion.  Kant is clear that there 
exists an interactive relationship between juridical states’ development to 
republicanism and facilitation of moral progress of individuals, who in turn 
demand higher moral performance from their governments in relation to the 
issues of their day. Rather than relying on coercion in a similar manner to the 
domestic juridical state, this chapter argued that it will be the self-enforcing will of 
the people that will ensure international law such as refugee right is respected. 
Ensuring that international law is respected in such a way could also reduce the 








This thesis was born from a personal moral response to the plight of international 
refugees in recent years, juxtaposed with Kant’s assertion in the law of hospitality 
that ‘a foreigner [must not] be treated with hostility because he has arrived on the 
land of another.’  According to Kant the state to which the foreigner appeals can 
only turn him away if this can be done without destroying him, …long as he 
behaves peaceably where he is, he cannot be treated with hostility (8:357-359).’ 
Kant’s position initially seemed to make a position on refugee right clear and 
plausible. However, consideration of how a refugee right could be implemented 
or enforced in the modern global community while adhering to Kantian principles 
raised many questions. We first had to decide what the content and scope of a 
refugee right drawn from Kant’s philosophy might be, since he never discussed 
the matter explicitly himself. For instance, does Kant’s refugee right only allow for 
a place to stay or are there more ‘modern’ refugee entitlements associated with 
it? The second question to be answered was, if a state were to refuse to accept 
a number of refugees, would another state be able to coerce them into doing so?  
 
Starting with his work in the Doctrine of Right, I explored the foundations of Kant’s 
understanding of external freedom and its importance to right and the juridical 
state. It was here that Kant first justified the use of coercion, showing that 
coercion is justified via the principle of contradiction, ‘If a free action is hindering 
the freedom of others in accordance with universal laws, then coercion used in 
opposition to this is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws 
(6:231)’. This first chapter acted as the foundation for the entire thesis, setting up 
a Kantian framework according to which the remainder of the thesis would have 
to follow.  
 
With this Kantian framework set up, I then unpacked the contents of Kant’s 
refugee right. By connecting the law of hospitality and Kant’s principle of non-
refoulement to the original right of possession of the Earth, I was able to ground 
a Kantian refugee right explicitly into protection of freedom. Following this, I 
argued that a Kantian refugee right could also offer protection beyond non-
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refoulement, with access to healthcare and education amongst the entitlements 
that could be justified under a Kantian refugee right.  
 
With the refugee right scaffolding in place, I examined how a refugee right could 
be implemented across the globe. While the initial aim of this thesis was to see a 
refugee right implemented in a similar manner to rights in the domestic state, the 
implementation of refugee right across the globe was found to be far more 
complex than how a right or law could be established domestically. In the Kantian 
juridical state, the citizens legislate, and an executive enforces (with coercion) 
these laws. However, internationally, there are questions over who or what this 
executive would be and how such laws could be introduced. Kant’s own 
suggestions of the coercive state of states and the non-coercive league of nations 
divide Kantian scholars, with some suggesting that Kant favoured the former and 
others the latter. After examining this debate, I found that a refugee right would 
not be able to be coercively enforced internationally, as it would violate state 
sovereignty and a citizens’ rights to set their own laws.  
 
While this thesis initially began with the belief that a refugee right would be a 
coercible law among states, careful examination of Kant’s philosophy found that 
this would not be possible without violating both citizen and state rights.  Despite 
this, Kant’s own notions of moral progress and enlightenment offer a path upon 
which refugee right can be agreed upon by states. This moral progress is 
undoubtedly optimistic and relies on citizens and states to want to follow certain 
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